Wyoming Asset Protection Case Law: Decisions on Homestead, Tenancy by the Entirety, Fraudulent Transfers, and Charging Orders

This page analyzes the most important Wyoming court decisions on asset protection, from the homestead and the exemption schedule to wages, retirement accounts, entireties property, life insurance, fraudulent transfers, the charging order, and the LLC veil.

What a Wyoming Homestead Protects

Wyoming’s homestead exemption goes to the owner who occupies the home. A fraudulent transfer of the home can cost the debtor the exemption too.

Zubrod v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 329 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2003). Leading case. A Wyoming lawyer facing a malpractice claim deeded his solely owned home into a tenancy by the entirety with his wife. The transfer was avoided as fraudulent. Section 522(g)(1) then barred him from claiming the homestead exemption in the sale proceeds, because the transfer was voluntary and the trustee recovered the property. 329 F.3d at 1201-02. Under Wyoming law tenants by the entirety “do not have separate interests in the property.” Id. at 1199.

Duncan v. Zubrod (In re Duncan), 294 B.R. 339 (10th Cir. BAP 2003). The debtor’s wife lived in the house but was not on the deed, and she claimed her own homestead exemption in the sale proceeds. The panel held that ownership is a prerequisite, because the statute gives the exemption to persons who “jointly own and occupy” the residence. It was “not at liberty to ignore the plain language contained in the statute.” 294 B.R. at 342-43. A married couple with one spouse on the deed gets one exemption.

United States v. Field, 190 F. Supp. 216 (D. Wyo. 1960). Decided under a repealed statute. The only decision on homestead sale proceeds held that the proceeds of a voluntary sale were exempt. 190 F. Supp. at 217-19. The 1957 section it construed protected proceeds “on execution or otherwise” and any later homestead bought with them. That section no longer exists, no current statute mentions sale proceeds, and the question is open.

Section 1-20-101 exempts a homestead. The homestead chart gives the current $100,000 figure. Section 1-20-102 keeps the exemption only while the owner, the person entitled to it, or the family occupies the home, and it gives each joint owner-occupant an exemption. Both Duncan decisions recite a homestead figure the Legislature has since raised. No decision construes the current text.

Personal Property and Bankruptcy Exemptions

Wyoming’s exemption schedule is a closed list with no wildcard and no exemption for cash or securities. Each person takes the listed exemptions in his own right.

Coones v. FDIC, 796 P.2d 803 (Wyo. 1990). Leading case. Answering certified questions, the court held that spouses who work in the same business may each claim the tools-of-trade exemption, because the statute says “any person.” 796 P.2d at 804. It refused to extend the wage garnishment limit to a rancher’s livestock proceeds or crops. “Profits and business earnings are outside the meaning of wage and salary.” Id. at 805-06. The general exemption statute “does not provide any provision for earnings exemption.” Id. at 805.

Gregory v. Zubrod (In re Gregory), 245 B.R. 171 (10th Cir. BAP 2000), aff’d, No. 00-8019 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000) (unpublished). A security officer’s practice pistol was not a tool of the trade. The test is whether the item is “the means by which a man’s business is carried on,” and a weapon the debtor did not carry at work failed it. 245 B.R. at 173-74. Exemption statutes are liberally construed, but the exemption “is still limited by what the terms of the statute can fairly be said to embrace.”

Russell v. Kuhnel (In re Kuhnel), 495 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). The debtors claimed the vehicle exemption on a truck whose lender had never perfected its lien. Section 522(g)(1) invalidated the exemption once the trustee recovered the lien, and the trustee could object after the thirty-day deadline even though she recovered it by persuading the lender rather than by suit. 495 F.3d at 1181-82. Duncan‘s reasoning applied “with perhaps even greater force.”

In re Johnson, 184 B.R. 141 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1995). A creditor argued that the debtor’s domicile during the 180 days before his petition was not Wyoming. He had spent that summer working in Minnesota. The court held his domicile was Wyoming, so the Wyoming exemptions governed. “The uncontroverted testimony established that the time Johnson spent in Minnesota was strictly for employment reasons.” 184 B.R. at 145. Domicile turns on intent and physical presence, so seasonal work elsewhere did not move it. Section 522(b)(3)(A) now looks back 730 days.

Section 1-20-106 lists household goods, a motor vehicle, three firearms, and the tools or professional library of a trade, each under a dollar cap. Nothing on the list reaches cash, a bank balance, a brokerage account, or securities, and there is no wildcard. No decision construes the section’s three-appraiser valuation. Section 1-20-109 opts Wyoming out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions and cites 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). The Tenth Circuit has stated the opt-out since Johnston v. Barney, 842 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1988).

Retirement Accounts

Wyoming exempts a retirement account without a cap, an inherited interest included. No court has construed the statute that says so.

Kingston v. Honeycutt, 908 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1995). Superseded by statute. On certified questions, the court held that a privately established, self-funded IRA was not exempt, because the subparagraph then in force reached only a plan paid by an employer to an employee or retired employee. A broader reading “would swallow the exemption.” 908 P.2d at 978. The classification survived an equal-protection challenge. The Legislature repealed that subparagraph in 2015, and the current section exempts a person’s interest in a retirement plan, IRAs and Roth IRAs included.

Section 1-20-110 also exempts money payable from a retirement plan and an inherited interest to the same extent the decedent’s was exempt. The IRA protection chart lists Wyoming among the states that protect inherited accounts by statute. A contribution within ninety days before a bankruptcy filing is not exempt, and a qualified domestic relations order lets an alternate payee reach the account. Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1998), raised the section and declined to decide it. No court has construed the current text, the inherited-interest provisions and the ninety-day rule included.

Wages and Bank Accounts

Wyoming garnishes wages at the federal minimum and protects deposited pay for twenty days. When a child-support order takes the whole permitted share, a judgment creditor cannot garnish the wages at all.

Royal v. Walsh, 2004 WY 96, 96 P.3d 1 (Wyo. 2004). Superseded by statute. On a certified question, a divided court held that wages deposited in the debtor’s bank account were not exempt from garnishment. The exemption reached only “accrued and unpaid” earnings, “money the debtor has earned but has not yet received,” and the statute addressed employers, not banks. 2004 WY 96, ¶¶ 5, 7. The Legislature has since added two sentences to section 1-15-408(a) that protect deposited earnings. The decision no longer states Wyoming law on deposited wages.

Union Pacific Railroad v. Trona Valley Federal Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203 (Wyo. 2002). A court-ordered child-support garnishment is not an amount required by law to be withheld, so it is not deducted in computing disposable earnings. Support garnishments have statutory priority, and a judgment creditor may garnish only the room the support order leaves under the general limit. 2002 WY 165, ¶¶ 13-15. Where the support order already takes the whole permitted share, the judgment creditor may not garnish wages at all, though other collection remedies remain open.

Section 1-15-408(b) states the share of disposable earnings a creditor may take. The garnishment chart gives the current figures. Subsection (a) now protects earnings deposited in the twenty days before a writ is served, on the day it is served, and for ten business days afterward. It also exempts the rest of a garnished paycheck’s proceeds once they are deposited. No decision construes either rule.

Two older decisions, Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392 (Wyo. 1987), and Hancock v. Stockmens Bank & Trust, 739 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1987), construed a wage exemption since replaced. Wyoming protects deposited wages and leaves deposited savings exposed.

Tenancy by the Entirety

Wyoming entireties property, personal property included, is beyond one spouse’s separate creditor, but an account must name the entireties on its face. The protection fails in several ways.

Radiance Capital Receivables Nineteen LLC v. Crow (In re Crow), 987 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2021). Leading case. A brokerage account holding roughly $2 million was labeled tenants by the entirety on its account application, and it was exempt from the bankruptcy estate. Where the four unities are missing, survivorship intent must be “evident from the language of the instrument itself,” and an account application qualifies. 987 F.3d at 918-20. A withdrawal right in either spouse did not defeat the entireties ownership. The exemption is fixed at the petition date.

Lurie v. Blackwell, 2002 WY 110, 51 P.3d 846 (Wyo. 2002). A Missouri bankruptcy trustee holding a judgment against the husband alone levied on a bronze sculpture in a Cody studio, and the court quashed the execution. Missouri law governed the 1978 Missouri conveyance, that law presumes that spouses hold personal property by the entirety, and neither state lets one spouse’s judgment creditor seize entireties property. 2002 WY 110, ¶ 13. The decision is first a conflict-of-laws case. Its footnote records that the same couple lost in Montana, which does not recognize entireties ownership.

Lewis v. Wolfe, 2026 WY 63 (Wyo. 2026). Section 34-1-140(b), added in 2023, deems “husband and wife” or “spouses” on a real-property deed a tenancy by the entirety unless the deed specifies otherwise. The court held it codified existing law. 2026 WY 63, ¶¶ 9-15. “If an instrument is silent as to the type of tenancy created, then we presume a tenancy in common has been created, even if the parties are husband and wife.” Id. ¶ 15. A footnote not citing Crow says a tenant by the entirety cannot convey without the other’s consent.

Baker v. Speaks, 2013 WY 24, 295 P.3d 847 (Wyo. 2013). The Bakers deeded two parcels to their son while a construction suit was pending. The court agreed that every conveyance was fraudulent, and it reversed anyway, because the Bakers held one parcel by the entireties and the judgment named the husband alone. 2013 WY 24, ¶ 55. When both spouses owe the judgment, the property is executable.

Baker v. Speaks, 2014 WY 117, 334 P.3d 1215 (Wyo. 2014). The Bakers had not been married when they took title, and on remand a Wyoming court could not declare a retroactive Utah marriage in an action the couple were not parties to. 2014 WY 117, ¶¶ 17-25. Without a marriage there is no entireties ownership, and the husband’s interest was executable. The court also held that the earlier conveyance act governs transfers made before July 1, 2006, and that the general four-year fraud limitation, running from discovery, applies to those claims. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

In re Jennings, No. WY-17-002 (10th Cir. BAP Nov. 21, 2017) (unpublished), aff’d sub nom. Jennings v. Royal, No. 17-8095 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2018) (unpublished order). Entireties property is not exempt from the couple’s joint debts, so the exemption equals the equity less every joint claim, and where joint claims exceed the equity none of it is exempt. The Tenth Circuit’s affirmance is likewise unpublished. It limits the exemption to the extent the entireties interest “exceeds the joint indebtedness” the couple owed. Neither decision binds a later court.

The protection also failed in Zubrod v. Duncan above, where a solely owned home retitled to both spouses ahead of a judgment was recovered as fraudulent.

How the protection fails	The rule	Authority
A debt both spouses owe	Entireties property answers for joint debts, and the exemption is equity less every joint claim	Baker v. Speaks (Wyo. 2013); Jennings (10th Cir. BAP 2017; 10th Cir. 2018)
No marriage when title was taken	No marriage, no tenancy by the entirety	Baker v. Speaks (Wyo. 2014)
A late retitling to both spouses	Avoided as fraudulent, and the homestead exemption lost with it	Zubrod v. Duncan (10th Cir. 2003)
An instrument silent on the tenancy	A tenancy in common, even between spouses	Lewis v. Wolfe (Wyo. 2026)
Property carried into a state without entireties ownership	That state’s conflict rule decides	Lurie v. Blackwell n.3 (Wyo. 2002)

Section 34-1-140(a) lets an owner create entireties ownership in real or personal property by naming the tenants in the conveying instrument. Subsection (b) supplies a presumption for real property and none for personal property, so a Wyoming account is protected only when its own paperwork names the entireties. No Wyoming state court has decided whether an account application is such an instrument. The tenancy by the entirety chart lists Wyoming among the personal-property states. Section 522(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts the interest to the extent Wyoming law shields it.

Life Insurance and Annuities

The one appellate decision there is lets a Wyoming debtor exempt the cash value of a policy he owns unless he changes the beneficiary for his own advantage. No Wyoming court has construed either insurance exemption.

Vigil v. Zubrod (In re Vigil), 74 F. App’x 19 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished order). The Tenth Circuit reversed Michaels v. Zubrod (In re Michaels), 282 B.R. 234 (10th Cir. BAP 2002), which had excluded the owner entirely. It held, predicting Wyoming law, that a Chapter 7 debtor may exempt the cash surrender value of a policy he owns “unless and until the debtor changes the beneficiary for his personal advantage.” Whether a beneficiary may exempt the cash value of another’s policy was left undecided. The order binds no later court.

Royal v. Pancratz (In re Pancratz), 175 B.R. 85 (D. Wyo. 1994). The only decision construing the annuity exemption. Section 26-15-132’s monthly limit reaches only benefits presently due and payable when the petition is filed. An annuity with no payment then due was entirely exempt. Where a payment was due, the excess over the limit was garnishable only to the extent wages are, which left $1,564.80 of a $1,969.74 payment exempt. 175 B.R. at 92-93. A federal district court decided it, and no Wyoming state court has construed the section.

Section 26-15-129 shields a policy’s proceeds and values from the insured’s creditors when someone other than the insured holds the benefit. It carves out dividends the debtor elected to receive in cash, transfers made to defraud creditors, and fraudulent premiums. The 2001 words the Tenth Circuit construed remain in the section unchanged. Section 26-15-132 caps the annuity exemption at a monthly figure listed in the best states comparison. The life insurance chart compares what each state protects for the owner and for the beneficiary.

Fraudulent Transfers Under Wyoming Law

Wyoming’s fraudulent transfer act reaches actual and constructive fraud and extinguishes a claim on its own clock. A creditor who proves the transfer fraudulent must still show the asset was reachable.

Mantle v. North Star Energy & Construction LLC, 2019 WY 29, 437 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2019). Leading case. Actual fraud under section 34-14-205(a)(i) must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, constructive fraud by a preponderance. 2019 WY 29, ¶¶ 88-89. Intent when the transfer was made is the test, proved by badges of fraud the statute now codifies, and the court weighs the indications for and against fraud. Reasonably equivalent value is “something more than the consideration necessary to support a contract,” measured at the transfer date from the creditors’ side. Id. ¶ 89.

In the Baker decisions above, the creditor proved the badges of fraud, lost to the entireties title, and won only once no marriage was found.

Section 34-14-205 states both kinds of fraud and codifies eleven badges of actual intent. Section 34-14-206(b) reaches a transfer an insolvent debtor makes to an insider on an old debt. Section 34-14-210 extinguishes an actual-intent claim after two years, or six months from discovery if later. It extinguishes a constructive-fraud claim after two years and an insider claim after six months. The four-year fraud period belongs to the repealed conveyance act, which governed transfers made before July 1, 2006. Wyoming has not adopted the 2014 Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.

The badges list itself comes from Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, an offshore-trust divorce decided under the earlier act, and Mantle carried it forward under the current one.

Charging Orders Against a Wyoming LLC

Wyoming confines a judgment creditor to a charging order against a member’s transferable interest, the sole member’s included, and bars foreclosure.

Pettine v. Lofstedt (In re Pettine), No. 23-013 (10th Cir. BAP Nov. 15, 2023). A Chapter 7 debtor held a small interest in a multi-member Wyoming LLC. Standing in the shoes of a hypothetical judicial-lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), the trustee could take a Wyoming charging order, and the court could authorize its sale. Section 544 “prevents Dr. Pettine from protecting his nonexempt right to receive distributions from the LLC by filing a chapter 7 case.” The panel reserved whether an exemption against the interest would change the result.

Section 17-29-503(g) makes the order the exclusive remedy and names the sole member, and it bars foreclosure and any order for accounts or inquiries. No Wyoming state court has read the section, and Pettine is the only decision that has. Burnett v. Steeley, 2008 WY 94 (Wyo. 2008), and the partnership decisions before it concern a former partnership statute, not the LLC act.

What the section is worth to a Wyoming LLC member living out of state turns on the court that hears the creditor’s collection suit. The charging order chart compares the states, and the Florida LLC comparison answers whether the bar protects a member who lives in Florida.

Piercing a Wyoming LLC

A Wyoming court can pierce a single-member LLC without any finding of fraud, and the statute the Legislature passed afterward confines the inquiry to four factors and forbids counting the single-member form.

GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc., 2014 WY 144, 337 P.3d 454 (Wyo. 2014). Leading case. The court affirmed a judgment piercing a single-member LLC and holding its sole member liable for a contract debt the LLC could not pay. It found no fraud of any kind and pierced anyway, because “a showing of fraud or an intent to defraud is not necessary.” 2014 WY 144, ¶¶ 52-56. The facts that carried it, a chronically thin operating balance, no employees, and consolidated tax returns under disregarded-entity treatment, were weighed before the 2016 amendment.

Section 17-29-304(c), added in 2016, confines a court to four factors: fraud, inadequate capitalization, failure to observe formalities required by law, and intermingling so complete that no distinction remains. No one factor except fraud is enough. Subsection (d) forbids weighing what is intrinsic to an LLC, single-member or not, including pass-through tax treatment, the loose formalities an LLC is allowed, and a member’s ownership and governance. Pass-through tax treatment and a member’s governance are two facts GreenHunter weighed, and the case’s own misuse-and-injustice test appears nowhere in the statute.

No Wyoming court has yet applied either subsection to a piercing claim. Mantle declined to pierce, held that members owe no fiduciary duty to the company’s creditors, and noted the amendment without applying it. Whether “fraud” in subsection (c) includes constructive fraud, and whether the tax bar reaches a member’s actual filings as well as the election, are undecided.

Wyoming’s four factors are a closed list, narrower than the general piercing doctrine, which weighs an open set of grounds and treats single ownership as a reason for closer scrutiny. A Wyoming LLC owned from another state gets the four-factor test on paper and a charging-order section no Wyoming court has construed.

The Wyoming Qualified Spendthrift Trust

No court has construed the Wyoming Qualified Spendthrift Trust sections. A creditor who wants the trust property has to prove a fraudulent transfer by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 4-10-517 bars a creditor’s claim to qualified trust property unless the creditor proves the transfer fraudulent by clear and convincing evidence. Section 34-14-210(b) gives a creditor who receives the statutory notice 120 days to sue. The notice is mailed to a known creditor and published for an unknown one. A creditor whose specific claim on the settlor predates the transfer escapes the 120 days. That creditor has two years from the transfer to sue, or six months from discovery if later, and must prove the earlier claim by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 4-10-520 puts three things outside the act: child support once the settlor is thirty days behind, a lender to whom the settlor listed the trust property for credit, and property the settlor received by a fraudulent transfer.

A Wyoming asset protection trust is untested against a settlor’s own home state, whose courts may apply their own law instead, and the national DAPT decisions show how courts have treated the form in other states.