Statute of Limitations on Debt by State

The statute of limitations on debt is the deadline a state gives a creditor or debt collector to sue on an unpaid balance. In most states the deadline falls between three and six years. The same balance can carry a different deadline depending on whether the debt is a written contract, a spoken promise, a promissory note, or a credit card account.

Once the deadline passes, the debt is time-barred. The creditor loses the right to sue, though collectors can still call and write. A creditor who sues before the deadline and wins converts the debt into a judgment. Most states make that judgment enforceable for ten to twenty years.

How Long a Creditor Has to Sue in Each State

Written contracts are agreements in writing that state the amount owed and the repayment terms; personal loans and auto loans are the usual examples. Oral contracts are spoken promises to repay. Promissory notes are written promises to pay a fixed amount on a set schedule, like the note behind a mortgage. Open-ended accounts are revolving credit lines the borrower can draw down, repay, and draw again, which is where credit cards fall.

Where a cell shows two numbers, the state’s courts have never decided which period governs a credit card account, and both candidates appear. The Authority column cites the statute behind every figure, along with the court decisions that control the harder classification questions.

Current as of August 2026. Download the statute of limitations on debt chart (PDF).

State	Written Contracts	Oral Contracts	Promissory Notes	Open-Ended Accounts	Authority
Alabama	6	6	6	3	Ala. Code §§ 6-2-34(4), (9), 6-2-37(1), 7-3-118(a); Ayers v. Cavalry SVP I, LLC, 876 So. 2d 474 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
Alaska	3	3	6	3	Alaska Stat. §§ 09.10.053, 45.03.118(a)
Arizona	6	3	6	6	Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-548(A)(1), (A)(2), 12-543(1), (2), 47-3118(A) (credit cards named in the six-year statute; a plain open or stated account is three)
Arkansas	5	3	5	5	Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-56-111(a), 16-56-105(1), (3), 4-3-118(a) (five years, a non-uniform adoption)
California	4	2	6	4	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 337(a), (b), 339(1); Cal. Com. Code § 3118(a)
Colorado	6	6	6	6	Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-80-103.5(1)(a), 4-3-118(a) (six years for any liquidated debt, written or not)
Connecticut	6	3	6	6	Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-576(a), 52-581(a), 42a-3-118(a); Tierney v. American Urban Corp., 170 Conn. 243 (1976) (three years reaches only an executory contract)
Delaware	3	3	6	3	10 Del. C. §§ 8106(a), 8109; 6 Del. C. § 3-118(a)
District of Columbia	3	3	3	3	D.C. Code §§ 28-3814(o), 12-301(7), 28:3-118(a) (six years on a note that is not consumer debt)
Florida	5	4	5	4	Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(2)(b), 95.11(3)(j), 673.1181 (which sets no period of its own and sends the question to chapter 95)
Georgia	6	4	6	4	O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-24, 9-3-25, 11-3-118(a); Hill v. American Express, 289 Ga. App. 576 (2008)
Hawaii	6	6	6	6	Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 657-1(1), 490:3-118(a)
Idaho	5	4	6	5	Idaho Code §§ 5-216, 5-217, 28-3-118(1); Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe, 159 Idaho 750 (2016)
Illinois	10	5	10	5	735 ILCS 5/13-206 (ten years on notes, a non-uniform rule), 5/13-205; Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 391 Ill. App. 3d 642 (2009)
Indiana	6	6	6	6	Ind. Code §§ 34-11-2-9(b), 34-11-2-7(1), 26-1-3.1-118(a)
Iowa	10	5	10	5 or 10 (unsettled)	Iowa Code §§ 614.1(5)(a), 614.1(4); Iowa has no settled classification of a card account
Kansas	5	3	6	3 or 5 (unsettled)	Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-511(1), 60-512(1), 84-3-118(a); Kansas has no settled classification of a card account
Kentucky	10	5	6	5	Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 413.160, 413.120(1), 355.3-118(1); Fulk v. LVNV Funding LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 967 (E.D. Ky. 2014)
Louisiana	3	3	5	3	La. Civ. Code arts. 3494(3), (4), 3498 (liberative prescription, the civil law equivalent)
Maine	6	6	6	6	14 M.R.S. § 752; 11 M.R.S. § 3-1118(1)
Maryland	3	3	6	3	Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101; Md. Code, Com. Law § 3-118(a)
Massachusetts	6	6	6	6	Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2; ch. 106, § 3-118(a)
Michigan	6	6	6	6	Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.5807(9), 440.3118(1)
Minnesota	6	6	6	6	Minn. Stat. §§ 541.05, subd. 1(1), 336.3-118(a)
Mississippi	3	3	6	3	Miss. Code Ann. §§ 15-1-49(1), 15-1-29, 75-3-118(a)
Missouri	10	5	10	5	Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 516.110(1), 516.120(1), 400.3-118(a) (ten years, a non-uniform adoption); Capital One Bank v. Creed, 220 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)
Montana	6	5	6	5	Mont. Code §§ 27-2-202(1), (2), 30-3-122
Nebraska	5	4	6	4	Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-205(1), 25-206; Neb. U.C.C. § 3-118(a); the Nebraska Supreme Court has not classified a card account
Nevada	6	4	6	4	Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.190(1)(b), 11.190(2)(a)-(c), 104.3118(1)
New Hampshire	3	3	6	3	N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 508:4, I, 382-A:3-118(a); mortgage notes track the mortgage under 508:6
New Jersey	6	6	6	6	N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:14-1(a), 12A:3-118(a)
New Mexico	6	4	6	4	N.M. Stat. §§ 37-1-3(A), 37-1-4
New York	3	3	3	3	N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 214-i, 213(2) (consumer credit figures; six years outside consumer credit, and New York enacted no commercial code period for notes)
North Carolina	3	3	6	3	N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52(1), 25-3-118(a), (h) (ten years on a sealed note)
North Dakota	6	6	6	6	N.D. Cent. Code §§ 28-01-16(1), 41-03-18(1)
Ohio	6	4	6	6	Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2305.06, 2305.07(A), (C), 1303.16(A) (six years on any consumer debt, written or not; the four-year period reaches only non-consumer debt)
Oklahoma	5	3	6	3	Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(1), (2); tit. 12A, § 3-118(a)
Oregon	6	6	6	6	Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 12.080(1), 12.090, 73.0118(1)
Pennsylvania	4	4	6	4	42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5525(a)(3), (8), 5501(b), 5529(b)(1) (twenty years under seal); 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3118(a)
Rhode Island	10	10	6	10	R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-1-13(a), 6A-3-118(a)
South Carolina	3	3	6	3	S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530(1), 15-3-520(a) (twenty years on a mortgage-secured note), 36-3-118(a)
South Dakota	6	6	6	6	S.D. Codified Laws §§ 15-2-13(1), 57A-3-118(a)
Tennessee	6	6	6	6	Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-109(a)(3) (ten years on a demand note under the same section), 47-3-118(a)
Texas	4	4	6	4	Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(3), (c); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118(a)
Utah	6	4	6	4 or 6 (unsettled)	Utah Code §§ 78B-2-309(1)(b), (2), 78B-2-307(1), 70A-3-118(1); Asset Acceptance LLC v. Stocks, 2016 UT App 84
Vermont	6	6	6	6	12 V.S.A. §§ 511, 508 (fourteen years on a witnessed note); 9A V.S.A. § 3-118(a)
Virginia	5	3	6	3	Va. Code §§ 8.01-246(A)(2), (A)(4), 8.3A-118(a) (three years where the debtor never signed the writing)
Washington	6	3	6	6	Rev. Code Wash. §§ 4.16.040(1), (2), 4.16.080(3), 62A.3-118(a) (six years on any account receivable)
West Virginia	10	5	5	5	W. Va. Code §§ 55-2-6, 46-3-118(a) (five years, a non-uniform adoption)
Wisconsin	6	6	6	6	Wis. Stat. §§ 893.43(1), 403.118(1)
Wyoming	10	8	6	8	Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-3-105(a)(i), (a)(ii)(A), 34.1-3-118(a)

Each figure is the state’s general rule for that form of debt. A few kinds of notes run longer. Pennsylvania gives an instrument under seal twenty years. South Carolina gives twenty years to a note secured by a mortgage, and New Hampshire ties a mortgage note to the life of the mortgage itself. Vermont allows fourteen years on a note signed before an attesting witness.

The promissory note column is the period for an ordinary note due on a set date. A note payable on demand runs six years from the demand in most states. In those states, if the holder never demands payment, the note is barred once ten years pass with no payment of principal or interest.

What Is the Statute of Limitations on Credit Card Debt?

Credit card debt is subject to a three- to six-year statute of limitations in most states. States disagree about what a credit card balance is: some courts read the cardholder agreement as a written contract, others treat the balance as an open account, and several states have never decided.

Illinois shows the stakes. Written contracts get ten years there and unwritten contracts five, and Illinois courts treat credit card debt as unwritten unless every essential term appears in the writing itself. Under Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 391 Ill. App. 3d 642 (2009), monthly account statements do not supply the missing terms, so the five-year period usually governs.

Missouri reads its ten-year writing period the same way. In Capital One Bank v. Creed, 220 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), the issuer produced no agreement signed by the cardholder, and the court held that accepting a written offer by using the card does not create a contract in writing. The five-year period governed, and the suit was time-barred.

Georgia applies its six-year written contract period only when the creditor produces the cardholder agreement. American Express produced its contract in Hill v. American Express, 289 Ga. App. 576 (2008), and the six years applied. An assignee lost its judgment in Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254 (2016), on timing rather than on the missing agreement. Even assuming the six-year period applied, the record showed a 2006 breach and a June 2012 filing.

The Idaho Supreme Court went the other way on unsigned agreements. In Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe, 159 Idaho 750 (2016), the court held that a preprinted cardholder agreement nobody signed is still an instrument in writing, rejecting the essential-terms test Illinois applies. Credit card debt therefore takes Idaho’s five-year written contract period.

Alabama lands on the short side. A debt buyer won judgment on an account stated in Ayers v. Cavalry SVP I, LLC, 876 So. 2d 474 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), and the appeals court reversed. Nothing showed the statement of account was ever rendered, and the court observed that the claim might instead be an open account, which Alabama limits to three years.

Iowa, Kansas, and Utah have never settled the classification, so their chart cells carry two numbers. The Iowa swing is the widest: ten years if a card agreement is a written contract, five if it is not. Utah’s legislature pointed toward six in 2019 by moving credit agreements into the six-year written instrument statute, but no Utah appellate court has ruled. Nebraska’s cell shows one number but the same doubt: four is the default for a contract that cannot be proved entirely from writings, and its supreme court has not classified a card account.

In some states the fight never starts. Tennessee gives written, oral, and open-account claims the same six years, and Colorado gives six years to any liquidated debt whether or not anything was signed.

What Is the Statute of Limitations on Medical Debt?

Medical debt has no separate statute of limitations in most states. A hospital or physician bill takes the state’s ordinary contract deadline, which puts most medical debt on a three- to six-year clock.

Three states and the District of Columbia have enacted shorter periods for medical debt. New York gives licensed hospitals and health care professionals three years from treatment, half its usual contract period. Florida’s 2024 law gives licensed hospitals and surgical centers three years, measured from the facility’s referral to a third-party collector. Virginia followed the same year: three years from the due date of the final invoice, whether the contract was written or not. In the District of Columbia, the three-year consumer debt deadline expressly reaches debt incurred for medical purposes.

The New York and Florida triggers point in opposite directions. New York’s clock starts at treatment, before the bill is even overdue. Florida’s can start months or years after the missed payment, because nothing runs until the referral to collection.

When the Clock Starts and What Resets It

The statute of limitations on a debt starts running when the creditor first has the right to sue, usually at the first missed payment. Some states set the start date by statute. Ohio starts the clock on a consumer account thirty days after the last charge or payment. Nevada dates the claim from the last transaction, charge, or credit on the account.

Oregon measures an account claim from the last charge or payment proved on the account, and interest and finance charges do not count as charges. A dormant balance that only accrues interest does not keep the Oregon clock running.

A payment made while the period is running restarts it in most states. Oklahoma restarts the full period on any part payment of principal or interest, and in Idaho a payment of principal or interest counts as a new signed promise. A signed written acknowledgment of the debt generally does the same.

Reviving a debt after the period has already expired is harder in most states. In Florida, an expired debt comes back only through a signed writing acknowledging the debt or promising to pay it. A bare payment does not revive an expired Florida debt, but a payment that arrives with a signed payment plan or a signed letter identifying the debt can still revive it.

A growing set of states bars revival outright. California has barred it longest: since 1872 a payment restarts only a running clock, never a claim already barred, and a 2019 amendment bars a creditor from filing suit at all once the period on a written contract or account has run. New York barred revival of consumer credit debt in 2022; Nevada followed in 2023 and reached all debt. Maryland and the District of Columbia bar revival of consumer debt, and the District’s rule binds original creditors as well as collection agencies.

Texas’s version is narrower: once a consumer debt held by a debt buyer is time-barred, no payment or reaffirmation revives it, though the rule does not reach original creditors. In Iowa a payment alone does not revive an expired debt; only a signed writing admitting the debt is unpaid does. Wisconsin goes furthest. When a Wisconsin period expires, the right to the money is extinguished, not just the remedy.

Tolling the Statute of Limitations

A few events pause the clock instead of restarting it. Absence from the state is the traditional one, and the statutes are narrower than they sound. The District of Columbia tolls only against its own residents who leave, or against a debtor who absconds or conceals himself after the claim arises. Courts read absence provisions narrowly against nonresidents, because a literal reading would erase the limitations defense in every suit against an out-of-state debtor.

Bankruptcy extends the deadline rather than pausing it. The automatic stay blocks collection suits while the case is open, and if the limitations period expires during the stay, the creditor has until at least thirty days after the stay ends.

Active military service stops the clock entirely. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act keeps the period of military service out of the count, so the clock stands still until discharge.

What to Do When Contacted About an Old Debt

A collector calling about a debt from years ago may have no right to sue on it. Whether the debt is time-barred turns on the date of the last payment and on which state’s deadline governs.

Federal law gives every person thirty days after receiving a collector’s written validation notice to dispute the debt in writing. A written dispute stops collection until the collector mails verification of the debt.

A debt collector must not sue, or threaten to sue, on a time-barred debt. The regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 1006.26, is strict; it applies whether or not the collector knew the deadline had passed, though it binds debt collectors rather than original creditors. A collector who sues anyway is liable for actual damages plus up to $1,000 in statutory damages.

None of that protects a person who ignores the lawsuit itself. Courts do not check the deadline on their own; the statute of limitations is a defense that must be raised in a written response. A person who never responds loses by default, and the default judgment is enforceable as if the period had never run.

Can a Time-Barred Debt Stay on a Credit Report?

Yes. The statute of limitations and the credit reporting period are separate clocks, so a debt the creditor can no longer sue on can sit on a credit report for years afterward.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act removes a collection or charged-off account after seven years, measured from 180 days after the delinquency that led to it. Later payments never restart the reporting period, even in states where a payment restarts the statute of limitations.

The reverse happens too. Rhode Island gives most contract debts ten years, so a Rhode Island debt can fall off the credit report while the creditor still has years to sue on it.

A judgment can lawfully outlast the seven years. The reporting statute lets a civil judgment remain for seven years or until its enforcement period expires, whichever is longer. None of the seven-year limits apply when the report supports a larger transaction. The Fair Credit Reporting Act lifts them for credit of $150,000 or more, life insurance with a face amount of $150,000 or more, or a job paying $75,000 a year or more.

Federal Debts with No Statute of Limitations

Federal student loans have no statute of limitations. Federal law abolishes every time limit on suing, enforcing a judgment, offsetting payments, or garnishing wages to collect them. The government can garnish up to 15 percent of disposable pay administratively, with no court judgment.

Treasury offset carries no time limit either. Tax refunds and federal benefit payments can be applied to old federal debts, and Social Security benefits are reachable despite the statute that normally shields them from creditors. Federal law does exempt $9,000 of federal benefit payments in any twelve-month period from offset.

Federal tax debt has a real deadline. The IRS gets ten years from the date of assessment to collect. The ten years can be extended by a separate written extension signed when the taxpayer enters an installment agreement; the installment agreement by itself does not move the deadline.

Child support has its own federal rule. Federal law makes each unpaid installment a judgment by operation of law. The judgment gets full faith and credit in every state and cannot be retroactively modified. How long those judgments stay collectible varies by state.

Which State’s Statute of Limitations Applies?

The state where the collection lawsuit is filed supplies the statute of limitations in most cases, even when the credit agreement names another state’s law. Courts treat limitation periods as procedural rules of the forum, and a standard choice-of-law clause reaches only the substance of the contract.

The New York Court of Appeals held in Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410 (2010), that a choice-of-law clause does not import the chosen state’s limitations period unless the agreement says so expressly.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached the same result in Webster Bank, N.A. v. Rosenbaum, No. 2020-117-Appeal (R.I. Feb. 16, 2022). The loan agreement said Connecticut law governed, and Connecticut’s six-year period would have barred the suit. Rhode Island’s ten-year period applied instead: the agreement named no limitations period, the borrower lived in Rhode Island, and the loan was secured by Rhode Island property. The defendants did not argue Rhode Island’s own borrowing statute on appeal, and the court said the outcome might have been different if they had.

A borrowing statute is the main way another state’s period enters the case. The typical statute bars a claim in the forum when the claim was already barred where it arose, and a credit card claim arises where the creditor suffers the loss, generally the creditor’s home state. A borrowing statute in this classic form can only shorten the time; it never lengthens it.

Several states wrote a different rule. Oklahoma borrows whichever period is longer. Arizona applies its own six-year credit card period whenever another state’s period conflicts with it. Wisconsin bars a claim if either state’s period has run, and Oregon, Minnesota, and Nebraska apply the limitations period of the state whose law governs the substance of the claim.

A choice-of-law clause can also bring the forum’s borrowing statute into the case. In Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, cardholder agreements selected Utah law and required suit in Utah courts. The Utah Supreme Court held that choosing Utah law chose all of Utah’s law, including its borrowing statute. Utah borrowed the four-year period of Pennsylvania, where the claims arose and were already barred, and the collection suits failed.

What Happens After a Creditor Wins a Judgment?

A judgment replaces the debt’s statute of limitations with a much longer enforcement period. Once a court enters judgment, the original deadline is spent; the judgment is typically enforceable for ten to twenty years and is renewable in many states.

Florida sits at the long end. A judgment entered by a Florida court of record lasts twenty years. Kansas judgments go dormant five years after entry unless the creditor renews or executes on them, though a dormant Kansas judgment can be revived. The District of Columbia sets the hardest stop: twelve years, after which the judgment cannot be revived and no new action can be brought on it.

A judgment also opens collection tools an unsecured creditor never has. The judgment creditor can garnish wages, levy bank accounts, and record liens against real property, and those tools stay available for as long as the judgment remains enforceable.

The deadline on a debt protects only a debtor who raises it as a defense. Someone who ignores a collection suit because the debt looks old can end up with a judgment against them that is enforceable for twenty years. Asset protection planning addresses the property a judgment can reach once it is entered.