Nevada Asset Protection Case Law: Decisions on Homestead, Spendthrift Trusts, Fraudulent Transfers, and Charging Orders

This page analyzes the most important Nevada court decisions on asset protection: the homestead and its declaration, wages and bank accounts, retirement accounts and annuities, community property, the spendthrift trust, fraudulent transfers, the charging order, and alter ego.

What a Nevada Homestead Protects

A creditor’s recorded judgment lien does not attach to a Nevada homestead that stays fully exempt, and the exemption stops where the purchase money was someone else’s.

Contrevo v. Mercury Finance Co. (In re Contrevo), 123 Nev. 20, 153 P.3d 652 (Nev. 2007). Leading case. A judgment lien recorded under section 17.150 cannot attach to homestead property that is fully exempt both when the judgment is recorded and when the property is sold. Such a lien “is void and ineffective as to the exempt equity.” 123 Nev. at 21, 153 P.3d at 653. The court rejected the dormant-lien rule. It left open whether a recorded lien reaches surplus equity that appears later, and no court has answered that question since.

Maki v. Chong, 119 Nev. 390, 75 P.3d 376 (Nev. 2003). The exemption does not apply where the money that bought the home traces directly to fraud or similar tortious conduct. Such a debtor is “not the type of debtor whom the legislature sought to protect.” 119 Nev. at 394, 75 P.3d at 379. “[T]he homestead exemption statute cannot be used as an instrument of fraud and imposition.” Id. The court also noted the judge-made child-support exception alongside the statutory carve-outs.

In re Tarkanian, 562 B.R. 424 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2014). Where the assets that funded the homestead “were the Debtors’ own assets, not those of a third party,” Maki “does not prohibit the Debtors from claiming a homestead.” 562 B.R. at 450-51. A declaration may be recorded until the execution sale is complete, so a debtor can create an exempt homestead on the day of the sale. Section 522(o) then cuts a bankruptcy debtor’s exemption by value the debtor moved into the home to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor during the prior ten years.

Jackman v. Nance, 109 Nev. 716, 857 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1993). A homestead may be claimed on premises used partly for business and partly as a dwelling, so long as they remain the family’s bona fide residence. Nevada limits the homestead by value, not by use. The dwelling’s share of the total value has no legal significance. 109 Nev. at 721, 857 P.2d at 10. The debtor homesteaded an equipment-rental building that held his apartment.

Greene v. Savage (In re Greene), 583 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2009). Section 522(p)’s 1,215-day period runs from the acquisition of ownership, not from the homestead declaration or the start of residency. A homestead is “a classification of property under state law,” not an interest that is acquired. 583 F.3d at 622-24. A debtor who bought the land outside the window took the full Nevada exemption though he declared the homestead sixteen days before filing. The decision reversed a bankruptcy court that had measured the period from the declaration.

Nevada Revised Statutes section 115.010 exempts a homestead up to an equity cap, and the Nevada homestead chart carries the current $605,000 figure. Every homestead cap in the decisions above is a figure the Legislature has since raised. The exemption does not reach a purchase-money or improvement obligation, a mechanic’s lien, taxes, a mortgage or home-equity loan, or an association lien under chapter 116.

A creditor who swears that the equity exceeds the cap can have the home appraised and the excess sold. The exempt sum paid to the owner stays protected only if it goes into a new home, identified within 45 days and possessed within 180.

What the creditor seeks	Reaches a Nevada homestead?	Authority
A recorded judgment lien on fully exempt equity	No, the lien is void as to the exempt equity	Contrevo (Nev. 2007)
Surplus equity that appears after the lien is recorded	Undecided	Contrevo n.13 (Nev. 2007)
A home bought with money traced from fraud	Yes, by equitable lien	Maki (Nev. 2003)
A home bought with the debtor’s own non-exempt money before the sale	No, outside bankruptcy	Tarkanian (Bankr. D. Nev. 2014)
A mixed business and residential property	No, the limit is value, not use	Jackman (Nev. 1993)
The full exemption for a recent mover, in bankruptcy	Yes, if the property was bought outside the 1,215-day window	Greene (9th Cir. 2009)
A civil forfeiture of the home	No	Aguirre (Nev. 2022)

The Homestead Declaration and Residence

Nevada’s homestead is claimed by a recorded declaration, and the claimant must actually live there, though a forced or temporary absence does not cost the exemption.

Aguirre v. Elko County Sheriff’s Office, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 32, 508 P.3d 886 (Nev. 2022). Leading case. There is no civil-forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption. The constitutional exceptions are taxes and purchase or improvement obligations, and the court declined to add one. Incarceration is a temporary absence that does not defeat bona fide residence. Leasing the home out during that absence is not abandonment. Abandonment takes a recorded declaration under section 115.040. Section 115.020 requires only substantial compliance, and a declaration “may be filed at any time before the actual sale under execution.”

Van Meter v. Nilsson (In re Nilsson), 129 Nev. 946, 315 P.3d 966 (Nev. 2013). A debtor must actually reside on the property. The “householder” of section 115.020 is one “in actual possession of the house,” and the court declined to adopt constructive occupancy. A father whose minor children still lived in the former marital home, while he lived in a travel trailer, could not homestead it. 129 Nev. at 950-53, 315 P.3d at 969-70. Aguirre later confined the holding to voluntary absences.

Section 115.020 requires a written declaration, signed, acknowledged, and recorded like a conveyance. It must state that the claimant resides on the premises and intends to claim them as a homestead. The exemption is not automatic. A Nevada bankruptcy court once treated an incarcerated declarant as a constructive occupant, and Aguirre declined to follow it.

Wages and Bank Accounts

Nevada exempts most of a paycheck, the exemption stays with deposited pay for as long as it can be traced, and the wildcard exemption stacks on top.

Christensen v. Pack (In re Christensen), 122 Nev. 1309, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006). Leading case. The earnings exemption follows earnings into a bank account and protects every deposit, not only the latest paycheck. It runs indefinitely while the money remains available for the debtor’s support, though property bought with exempt wages is not itself exempt. 122 Nev. at 1321-22, 149 P.3d at 47-48. Commingling does not destroy the exemption “so long as tracing is possible,” and first-in, first-out is the tracing method. Id. at 1323, 1325-26, 149 P.3d at 49-50.

In re Galvez, 115 Nev. 417, 990 P.2d 187 (Nev. 1999). Superseded by statute. A real-estate agent’s lump-sum commission was not exempt, because the exemption reached only earnings “periodic in nature.” 115 Nev. at 421, 990 P.2d at 190. In 2005 the Legislature redefined “earnings” to include a commission or bonus. Christensen says the amendment was aimed at Galvez. 122 Nev. at 1320, 149 P.3d at 47.

Platte River Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 82, 500 P.3d 1257 (Nev. 2021). The wildcard exemption stacks on earnings. Because the earnings exemption protects only part of a paycheck, the attachable remainder is “personal property not otherwise exempt,” and the debtor may claim it under the wildcard. Earnings fall within the statutory definition of personal property, and the wildcard’s inclusive list left no room for the creditor’s argument that earnings were excluded.

Weinstein v. Fox (In re Fox), 129 Nev. 377, 302 P.3d 1137 (Nev. 2013). A judgment debtor may not claim the vehicle exemption or the wildcard for a non-debtor spouse. The exemptions run to “the judgment debtor,” and a debtor gets one of each. 129 Nev. at 381-82, 302 P.3d at 1140. The wildcard figure in the opinion has since been raised.

Section 21.090(1)(g) states what a debtor keeps and section 31.295 states what a creditor may garnish. The exemption counts pay that has already reached a bank account as earnings. A support order, a bankruptcy court order, and a tax debt are outside the limit. No decision construes section 31.295. The garnishment chart carries the current percentages.

A Nevada bank levy leaves a floor accessible without any claim by the debtor, and the money above it answers the writ unless the debtor traces it to an exempt source.

Retirement Accounts, Life Insurance, and Annuities

Nevada exempts money held in a retirement account up to a cap, and the exemption ends when the money comes out.

In re Gagow, 590 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018). Section 21.090(1)(r) exempts money “held in” an individual retirement arrangement. Funds the debtor withdrew before filing and deposited in a checking account were not exempt. Nevada has no counterpart to the federal sixty-day rollover grace. 590 B.R. at 522-25. The same opinion held that the corporate-stock exemption reaches only stock of a Nevada corporation, so a membership interest in a California LLC was not exempt. Id. at 525-26. The wildcard remained available for the balance.

Section 21.090(1)(r) exempts retirement accounts, an inherited IRA included, up to the cap the IRA protection chart carries at $1,000,000. Section 21.090(1)(k) exempts life insurance, and the life insurance chart carries the current rule. Section 687B.290 puts annuity benefits beyond execution. The exception is a premium paid with intent to defraud creditors, and the creditor must give the insurer written notice before payment. No Nevada court has construed the annuity section.

A rollover from an employer plan trades ERISA’s uncapped protection for the Nevada cap, and a Nevada resident’s IRA is exposed above that cap and the day money is withdrawn.

Community Property and a Spouse’s Creditors

A debt one spouse incurs during the marriage reaches the whole community property, and a premarital debt reaches neither the community nor the other spouse.

United States v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). The court surveyed the seven equal-management community-property states, Nevada included, and stated the rule for a debt contracted by one spouse after the wedding. Such a debt “may be satisfied only from community property or the separate property of the incurring spouse.” 816 F.2d at 491 n.12. The other spouse’s separate property answers only for a debt that spouse undertook or, in Nevada, for necessaries. The holding itself concerned credit discrimination, and the footnote cites the 1985 statutes.

Greear v. Greear, 303 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962). With “no Nevada cases precisely in point,” the court predicted Nevada law and held that the community does not answer for either spouse’s premarital debts. It created one exception. Support or alimony owed to a former spouse or children “must remain a charge upon the earnings of the obligor until its termination,” whether or not a new community is formed. 303 F.2d at 896. The Nevada Supreme Court has neither adopted nor rejected the exception.

Norwest Financial v. Lawver, 109 Nev. 242, 849 P.2d 324 (Nev. 1993). One spouse’s Chapter 7 discharge bars a creditor holding a community claim from later reaching post-petition community property, the non-filing spouse’s wages included. 109 Nev. at 244-47, 849 P.2d at 325-27. Whether a debt is community or separate turns on what the lender intended when it lent. Loan proceeds taken during marriage are presumed community, and the wages of either spouse during marriage are community funds whoever earns more.

Carlson v. McCall, 70 Nev. 437, 271 P.2d 1002 (Nev. 1954). A judgment creditor of the husband alone levied on the couple’s ranch. The court treated the debt as a community obligation and the ranch as community property “subject to execution to satisfy a judgment upon a community obligation.” Against a creditor, property acquired after marriage is presumed community. Rebutting the presumption takes clear, certain, and convincing proof of transmutation. The wife’s proof fell short.

Section 123.050 keeps a spouse’s separate property and share of the community away from the other spouse’s premarital debts. Section 123.090 makes separate property answer for the other spouse’s necessaries of life. Nevada has no tenancy by the entirety. A Nevada couple cannot hold an account the way an entireties couple can. The Nevada Supreme Court has never stated the general rule for one spouse’s creditor against the community.

One spouse’s Chapter 7 discharge in Nevada shields the couple’s later community earnings from a community claim, and what the lender intended when it lent decides whether the debt was the community’s at all.

The Nevada Spendthrift Trust

Nevada spendthrift protection ends once the beneficiary can compel a distribution of principal, and the two-year creditor window belongs only to a trust that qualifies.

In re Frei Irrevocable Trust, 133 Nev. 50, 390 P.3d 646 (Nev. 2017). Leading case. “Once a beneficiary is entitled to have the trust principal conveyed to him or her . . . any spendthrift protection becomes invalid.” An unexercised right to compel distribution is enough, and the court affirmed on that ground. The settlor and every prejudiced beneficiary may modify such a trust by consent, and the court reserved whether the spendthrift clause was a material purpose.

Snow Covered Capital, LLC v. Fonfa, No. 2:22-cv-01181 (D. Nev. Aug. 28, 2024). An order denying a motion to dismiss. The two-year window of section 166.170 applies only to a valid spendthrift trust; otherwise a fraudulent-transfer claim takes the general four-year period of section 112.230. A trust whose sole trustee was also its sole beneficiary, with power to distribute to himself “at his discretion,” “for his needs,” and “without limitation,” was not a valid spendthrift trust under Frei. The claims were timely. The ruling binds no other court.

Ambrose v. First National Bank of Nevada, 87 Nev. 114, 482 P.2d 828 (Nev. 1971). Under the statute as it then read, a settlor could not create a spendthrift trust for herself. The Legislature superseded that holding in 1999 by allowing a settlor to be a beneficiary. The second holding stands. The court said “a trust which does not provide for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary may not qualify as a spendthrift trust.” 87 Nev. at 118-19, 482 P.2d at 830-31. Such a beneficiary may alienate the interest or compel early termination.

King v. King (In re King), 295 Or. App. 176, 434 P.3d 502 (Or. Ct. App. 2018). An Oregon court applied Nevada law under the trust’s own choice-of-law clause. Section 166.120 does not bar surcharging a breaching trustee-beneficiary’s own interest to compensate the trust. The section speaks of creditors and proceedings outside the trust’s own affairs. 434 P.3d at 511-12. No Nevada court has adopted or rejected the reading.

A former spouse could not reach two Nevada self-settled spendthrift trusts in Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. 164 (2017), one of the national DAPT decisions.

Section 166.170 gives an existing creditor two years after the transfer or six months after discovery, whichever is later, and a later creditor two years, with proof by clear and convincing evidence. Section 166.120 restrains alienation of the beneficiary’s interest by any process. No bankruptcy court has construed either section. A Nevada asset protection trust protects a settlor who lives in Nevada, and not one who lives elsewhere.

Fraudulent Transfers Under Nevada Law

Nevada still applies the 1984 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a transferee must show good faith objectively, and the act treats the debtor’s alter ego as the debtor.

Herup v. First Boston Financial, LLC, 123 Nev. 228, 162 P.3d 870 (Nev. 2007). Leading case. The act reaches actual fraud, constructive fraud, and a transfer by an insolvent debtor. A court cannot avoid a transfer as actually fraudulent without first finding intent and working through the badges. 123 Nev. at 234, 162 P.3d at 874. The transferee must show “objectively that he or she did not know or had no reason to know of the transferor’s fraudulent purpose,” and must have paid reasonably equivalent value. Id. at 237, 162 P.3d at 876.

Magliarditi v. TransFirst Group, Inc., No. 73889, 2019 WL 5390470 (Nev. Oct. 21, 2019) (unpublished order). On certified questions, the court concluded that alter ego is an independent claim, brought in a separate action under Callie v. Bowling, not by amending the judgment. It applies to LLCs and partnerships. An alter ego of the debtor is a “debtor” under the act, and a transfer between them is a “transfer.” The court declined to answer whether the doctrine reaches a trust or a spendthrift trust. The order binds no later court but federal courts follow it.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Radecki, 134 Nev. 619, 426 P.3d 593 (Nev. 2018). A regularly conducted, non-collusive association foreclosure sale is outside the act. Such a sale is for “reasonably equivalent value” whatever the price, here $4,000 for a property assessed at $56,197. 426 P.3d at 597-98. The court followed the United States Supreme Court’s reading of the same words in the Bankruptcy Code.

Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP, 131 Nev. 114, 345 P.3d 1049 (Nev. 2015). A creditor’s remedy under the act is an equitable right to the property, and there is no damages claim against a non-transferee. Aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy theories failed against a law firm that was not a transferee. The decision sits with the other lawyer liability decisions.

Section 112.180 defines actual and constructive fraud and lists eleven badges. Section 112.230 sets the four-year limit and the one-year discovery limb, and it does not apply to a transfer to a spendthrift trust under chapter 166. The act’s definition of “asset” excludes exempt property and community property beyond the reach of one spouse’s creditor, so the homestead, the exemptions, and the marital rules above decide what the act can reach. Nevada has not enacted the 2014 Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, and its courts call the statute NUFTA.

Charging Orders Against Nevada Entities

Nevada bars foreclosure on a charging order against an LLC interest or a small corporation’s stock, but a partnership interest can be charged and sold.

Weddell v. H2O, Inc., 128 Nev. 94, 271 P.3d 743 (Nev. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Tahican, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 523 P.3d 550 (Nev. 2023). Leading case. A judgment creditor holding a charging order under section 86.401 has only an assignee’s economic rights, with no management rights and no interest in the LLC’s assets. The order divesting management rights was reversed. The charging order triggered the operating agreement’s involuntary-transfer clause. The statute the court read was the pre-2011 text, and Tahican abrogated only the lis pendens holding.

Becker v. Becker, 131 Nev. 857, 362 P.3d 641 (Nev. 2015). The exemption for stock in a small corporation does not exempt the shareholder’s economic interest. That interest stays subject to the charging order of section 78.746, which gives the creditor only an assignee’s right to distributions and dividends. The debtor keeps the noneconomic interest, and the creditor may neither manage nor foreclose. The court contrasted the partnership statute, which permits foreclosure.

Tupper v. Kroc, 88 Nev. 146, 494 P.2d 1275 (Nev. 1972). Under the partnership statute then in force, a court that charged a partner’s interest could also order it sold. Tupper’s half interest in three limited partnerships went at a sheriff’s sale for $2,500 against a $54,609 judgment. The price was not inadequate as a matter of law. 88 Nev. at 153. The buyer took only the share of profits and surplus, not management rights, and the debtor “was forever foreclosed from receiving any profits or surplus.” Id. at 152 n.2.

Section 86.401 gives a creditor one remedy against a member’s interest, the charging order, in a company of any size, and bars foreclosure. The statute’s one-member language has not been tested in the Nevada Supreme Court by a creditor seeking to foreclose. Section 78.746 applies the same rule to stock in a small corporation. The charging order chart compares the states. Whether Nevada’s bar protects a member who lives elsewhere turns on which state’s court hears the collection case and where that court puts the membership interest, and the courts have split.

Alter Ego and Piercing a Nevada LLC

A creditor who pierces a Nevada LLC must prove three elements and sue the alleged alter ego separately, and whether the doctrine reaches a spendthrift trust is undecided.

Ene v. Graham, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 26, 546 P.3d 1232 (Nev. 2024). Leading case. The court read section 86.376 for the first time. The three elements are analyzed as under the corporate statute, a court must make findings on each, and one-person ownership alone is insufficient. Formalities, records, commingling, and prejudice are weighed, and the plaintiff must show a causal link to the injury. The judgment against the member was reversed.

Gardner v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 133 Nev. 730, 405 P.3d 651 (Nev. 2017). An LLC can be pierced as an alter ego, and the statute that keeps members clear of company debts does not cover a member’s own negligence. Magliarditi rests on the decision and extends its logic to partnerships.

LFC Marketing Group, Inc. v. Loomis, 116 Nev. 896, 8 P.3d 841 (Nev. 2000). Reverse piercing against a corporation is available in limited instances on the same three elements. A $25,000 judgment was satisfied from escrowed commissions though the debtor owned no share, and the court weighed the position of innocent shareholders and creditors. No Nevada Supreme Court decision has applied reverse piercing to an LLC against the charging-order statute.

Section 86.376 makes a person liable for an LLC’s debt only as its alter ego. That takes a company influenced and governed by the person, a unity of interest and ownership that makes the two inseparable, and a fiction whose adherence would sanction fraud or promote manifest injustice. The Nevada Supreme Court has never answered whether the doctrine reaches a spendthrift trust; it declined the question in 2019. Section 163.418 adds that a settlor is not treated as the trustee’s alter ego without clear and convincing evidence.

Nevada leaves exposed the community property on a debt incurred during the marriage, the part of a retirement account above the cap, and any trust whose beneficiary can demand the principal, and planning starts there.