Garnishment Case Law in Florida

Florida garnishment law is governed by Chapter 77 of the Florida Statutes and interpreted through decades of case law defining the procedure’s limits. Courts have consistently held that garnishment is a special statutory proceeding subject to strict construction, meaning creditors who fail to follow the rules exactly lose the right to the debtor’s funds.

The cases below address the questions that arise most often in practice: how far a Florida writ can reach, what qualifies as protected wages, and when funds deposited in a bank account retain their exemption.

Strict Construction of Garnishment Statutes

Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal established the governing principle in Gigliotti Contracting North, Inc. v. Traffic Control Products of North Florida, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The court held that garnishment statutes must be strictly construed because garnishment is a special statutory proceeding, not an ordinary civil action. A creditor who fails to comply with the deadlines, notice requirements, or procedural steps prescribed by Chapter 77 risks having the writ dissolved.

This principle controls every garnishment dispute that follows. Courts do not have discretion to bend the rules or extend deadlines that the statute defines, because the legislature—not the judiciary—created the garnishment remedy and set its terms.

The Fourth District reinforced this framework in BNP Paribas v. Wynne, 944 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). BNP Paribas obtained a pre-judgment garnishment writ against Wynne, alleging fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and other business torts. Wynne moved to dissolve the writ after the statutory 20-day deadline. BNP Paribas argued the late filing should result in a default.

The court affirmed dissolution on a different ground: pre-judgment garnishment under Florida law is only available for liquidated damages, meaning debts that are fixed in amount. Because BNP Paribas sought “unspecified general damages in excess of $15,000,” the writ should never have been issued. The court held that a default based on a procedurally deficient writ would have to be set aside regardless of timing.

The decision also addressed whether courts can extend the 20-day deadline for motions to dissolve under § 77.07(2). The majority concluded that Rule 1.010 defers to the statute in special statutory proceedings, so courts lack authority to grant extensions. The deadline is fixed by statute, and missing it produces a default.

Extraterritorial Garnishment: From APR Energy to HB 265

Florida courts spent more than a decade debating whether a writ of garnishment can reach bank accounts located outside the state. The question is whether serving a writ on a bank’s Florida branch gives the court authority over accounts maintained at the bank’s offices elsewhere.

The Middle District of Florida answered no in APR Energy, LLC v. Pakistan Power Resources, LLC, No. 3:08-cv-961 (M.D. Fla. 2009). The court held that Florida’s garnishment statutes do not have extraterritorial effect and that the court must have in rem jurisdiction over the actual bank account—not just personal jurisdiction over the bank. Serving a bank at its Florida branch does not bring out-of-state accounts within the court’s reach.

The Southern District followed the same reasoning in Skulas v. Loiselle, No. 09-60096-CIV (S.D. Fla. 2010). The creditor served a writ on PNC Bank at its Fort Lauderdale branch to reach an account that was opened and maintained in Pennsylvania. The court recommended dissolving the writ, holding that the account was located where it was opened and that a Florida court lacked jurisdiction over property situated in another state. Garnishment is a quasi in rem proceeding, and the property must be within the forum state’s jurisdiction.

The Middle District reached the same conclusion again in Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 149 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2015). The Stansell plaintiffs held a $318 million judgment against the FARC under the federal Anti-Terrorism Act and sought to garnish accounts at Florida-based banks. The court held that nothing in the language or structure of Florida’s garnishment statutes demonstrated that they were intended to apply to bank accounts outside the state.

The Florida Legislature responded with CS/HB 265, effective July 1, 2025. The bill amended Chapters 56 and 77 to provide that writs of garnishment and proceedings supplementary apply to intangible assets wherever they are located, including bank accounts, financial assets, and other intangible property. Under the amended statute, serving a writ on any entity subject to Florida personal jurisdiction gives the court in rem authority over the debtor’s intangible assets wherever located.

The 2025 amendment was prompted by the Stansell litigation specifically, but its language applies to all garnishment proceedings, not just terrorism-related judgments. The practical effect is that the APR Energy and Skulas holdings are now legislatively overruled. A creditor can now serve a writ on any bank with a Florida branch and reach accounts the bank maintains elsewhere, provided the bank is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida.

This change affects debtors who relied on maintaining accounts at out-of-state branches of national banks as a collection barrier. Before 2025, that geographic separation created a genuine jurisdictional obstacle. After HB 265, it does not.

Independent Contractor Wage Claims

Florida’s head of household wage exemption under § 222.11 protects earnings from garnishment, but courts have debated whether independent contractors qualify. The answer depends on the nature of the relationship, not the label the parties assign to it.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed the question in In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir. 1993). The court held that Florida’s statutory wage exemption did not cover monies paid to an independent contractor. The exemption protects “wages” and “earnings” from “personal labor or services,” which the court interpreted as compensation paid in an employment relationship rather than payments for independent contract work.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida reached the same result in In re Branscum, 229 B.R. 32 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). The court confirmed that payments to independent contractors fall outside the scope of the wage exemption. The distinction is between someone earning a salary or hourly wage under an employer’s direction and someone performing work as an independent business.

The Bankruptcy Court then introduced a more flexible standard in In re Pettit, 224 B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998). The court held that the label of “independent contractor” is not dispositive. Instead, courts apply a totality of the circumstances test that examines the actual nature of the working relationship. Factors include the degree of control the payer exercises over the worker, whether the worker has the ability to hire assistants, whether the worker supplies their own tools, and whether the compensation is structured as regular periodic payments.

The Pettit test creates a narrow path for workers labeled as independent contractors to claim the wage exemption. A licensed real estate agent receiving regular commissions under a broker’s supervision may qualify. A sole practitioner running their own business from their own office typically will not. The distinction is between someone who functions as an employee despite the label and someone who operates an independent business generating profit rather than wages.

Wages vs. Business Distributions: In re Harrison

The Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court drew a sharp line between wages and business distributions in In re Harrison, 216 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997). Harrison owned a 50% interest in a dental practice organized as a professional association. He claimed his income from the practice was exempt from creditors under the head of household wage protection.

The court denied the exemption. Harrison’s income consisted of discretionary profit distributions, not regular compensation under an employment agreement. He received distributions when the practice generated surplus revenue, and the amounts varied based on the business’s performance. The court held that discretionary distributions to an owner are fundamentally different from wages paid to an employee, even when the owner also provides personal services.

The case establishes a planning principle that matters for self-employed professionals. Income earned through a professional practice is not automatically protected as wages. The exemption applies only when the professional has a written employment agreement specifying a fixed salary paid at regular intervals. Without that structure, the income is treated as business profit, and the head of household exemption does not apply.

Traceable Wages in Bank Accounts: In re Weinshank

The Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court expanded wage protection for bank deposits in In re Weinshank, 406 B.R. 413 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). The debtor was not the head of household, which would typically mean no wage exemption applied. The debtor argued that wages deposited into a bank account remained exempt under § 222.11(3), which protects deposited wages for six months.

The court agreed. Florida Statute § 222.11(3) does not limit the bank-account wage protection to heads of household. Any debtor whose wages are deposited in a bank account can claim the exemption for up to six months, provided the funds are traceable to wages. The statute creates an independent protection that applies regardless of head of household status.

The practical difficulty is tracing. If wages are commingled with other funds in the same account—business income, investment returns, transfers from other accounts—the debtor must prove which dollars originated as wages. Courts apply the first-in, first-out (FIFO) method or the lowest intermediate balance rule (LIBR) depending on the circumstances. Both methods require detailed records showing the source and timing of deposits and withdrawals.

The Weinshank holding creates a planning opportunity: depositing wages into a separate account that receives no other funds eliminates the tracing problem entirely. It also means debtors who are not heads of household still have a meaningful window of protection for their wage accounts if they maintain proper records.

Non-Resident Head of Household: Ulisano v. Ulisano

The Fourth District Court of Appeal confirmed in Ulisano v. Ulisano, 154 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), that a non-resident head of household can claim Florida’s wage exemption. The case resolved a question created by a 1993 amendment to § 222.11, which removed the phrase “residing in this state” from the exemption’s eligibility requirements.

Before 1993, only Florida residents could claim the head of household wage exemption. A debtor living in Georgia but earning wages from a Florida employer had no protection. The legislative amendment eliminated the residency requirement, but courts had not addressed what that change meant in practice until Ulisano.

The Fourth District held that the amended statute’s plain language controls: any head of household earning wages in Florida can claim the exemption, regardless of domicile. The court applied the same strict-construction principle from Gigliotti, reasoning that the legislature’s decision to remove the residency language was intentional and must be given effect.

The decision matters for asset protection planning because it means the garnishment exemption framework applies to the income, not the person’s domicile. A non-resident working for a Florida-based company can claim the head of household exemption against a Florida garnishment writ, provided they meet the other requirements—supporting a dependent and not having waived the exemption in writing.