Federal Creditor Case Law

This page analyzes the most important federal court decisions on what the IRS and other federal creditors can reach, from the federal tax lien and criminal restitution to forfeiture and the SEC and FTC enforcement actions that have tested offshore trusts.

What a Federal Tax Lien Reaches

A federal tax lien attaches to every interest in property that state law gives the taxpayer, and once it attaches, federal law alone decides what the IRS can take.

United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). Leading case. State law exempted a Louisiana wife’s community-property share from her husband’s creditors, and the IRS reached it for his premarital income tax anyway. “[A]n exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector. Federal law governs what is exempt from federal levy.” 403 U.S. at 204. Section 6334(c) leaves “no room in it for automatic exemption” where state law alone exempts the property. Id. at 204-05. The Court called these “hard cases” and pointed to the innocent-spouse statute as the remedy.

United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). The lien statute “creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.” 357 U.S. at 55. An insured who could have collected the cash surrender value of his life policies in his lifetime had “property” in that value, and the lien reached it even though state law exempted it from creditors. Id. at 55-57. The Court reached only the cash surrender value, not the proceeds a beneficiary receives after death.

United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985). A federal tax lien “is not self-executing”; the IRS must levy or sue to enforce it. 472 U.S. at 720. The IRS may serve a notice of levy on a joint bank account without first proving the delinquent taxpayer’s share. The levy is a provisional remedy, the bank must honor it, and a codepositor’s remedy is a wrongful-levy suit afterward. The IRS must still give written notice that it intends to levy, and the taxpayer has thirty days to request a hearing.

The decision in Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999), applied the same two-step test to an heir’s disclaimer and is discussed on the inherited assets page. The heir’s disclaimer failed against the IRS, because his power to take or redirect the inheritance was itself property.

Section 6321 makes an unpaid tax a lien “upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person,” and § 6322 dates the lien from the assessment. State law says whether the taxpayer owns anything; federal law then decides what follows (Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960)). The lien binds a purchaser, a secured lender, or a judgment creditor only once the IRS files notice. An administrative levy under § 6331 takes only the taxpayer’s own property, so reaching a co-owner’s interest requires a § 7403 suit.

Exemptions Against an IRS Levy

Federal law alone decides what an IRS levy cannot take, the list is short, and it protects property from levy, not from the lien itself.

Matter of Voelker, 42 F.3d 1050 (7th Cir. 1994). Leading case. The IRS lien attaches to personal property that § 6334 exempts from levy. The exemption bars the administrative seizure, not the lien, and the practical effect is that the debtor pays the IRS more. 42 F.3d at 1053 & n.4. In re May, 194 B.R. 853, 858-59 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1996), states the same distinction, property the IRS held a lien on but could not levy.

Schlossberg v. Barney, 380 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2004). A bankruptcy trustee tried to use § 544(a)’s hypothetical-lien-creditor status to claim the IRS’s power over state exemptions. The Fourth Circuit refused; the override belongs to the IRS alone. The court noted that § 522(c)(2)(B) leaves exempt property subject to a federal tax lien and that Mitchell holds a state homestead law does not bar an IRS levy.

In re Terwilliger’s Catering Plus, 911 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990). A liquor license was “property” for § 6321 though state law said otherwise, and the argument that state law shields it “is foreclosed.” Section 6334(c) means “no property is exempt” beyond subsection (a).

The Florida decision Lawler v. SunTrust Securities, Inc., 740 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), is an entry on the Florida exemption page; Florida’s IRA exemption gave no protection against an IRS levy, because § 6334 lists no IRA.

Section 6334(a) is a closed list. It covers clothing and school books, capped furniture and tools, unemployment and workers’ compensation benefits, undelivered mail, railroad and military retirement annuities, court-ordered child support, public assistance, service-connected disability benefits, and a wage exempt amount that depends on filing status and dependents. A principal residence is on the list, but a judge or magistrate of a district court may approve a levy on it in writing. No retirement account of any kind appears.

Subsection (c) then bars every other exemption, whatever any state law or other federal statute says, and the Treasury regulation repeats that no state homestead or personal-property exemption stops a federal levy.

Retirement Plans Against the IRS

ERISA’s anti-alienation rule keeps a pension out of a bankruptcy estate and away from ordinary creditors, but it does nothing against an IRS levy.

Under Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), an ERISA plan’s anti-alienation clause binds the bankruptcy trustee, so the account stays out of the estate; the decision is analyzed on its own page and listed on the Florida exemption page.

United States v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119 (6th Cir. 1996). Leading case. ERISA’s anti-alienation provision does not bar an IRS levy on a qualified plan. A Treasury regulation excepts IRS levies from the rule, and the court held the regulation reasonable; reading ERISA to bar levies “would ‘alter or amend’ I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6331, and 6334.” Neither Patterson nor Guidry helps the taxpayer, because both concern private creditors.

In re McIntyre, 222 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2000). The IRS may levy ERISA pension benefits to their full face value for the husband’s tax debt alone. The wife’s California community-property half-interest did not cut the levy in half, and ERISA’s anti-alienation provision did not limit the federal levy.

IRS v. Snyder, 343 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2003). A federal tax lien on a debtor’s interest in an ERISA plan is a secured claim in bankruptcy, though Patterson excludes the plan interest itself from the estate. Shanbaum v. United States, 32 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1994), holds pension benefits not exempt from IRS levy and discharges a plan trustee who honors one.

The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all hold the same way, and no decision holds that ERISA’s anti-alienation provision stops an IRS levy. The § 6334(a) list carries no private pension, no 401(k), and no IRA; its only retirement items are railroad and military annuities. Patterson and Guidry protect a plan from a bankruptcy trustee and a private creditor, and neither reaches the IRS. The IRA protection chart compares the state exemptions that ordinary creditors must honor.

Entireties Property After Craft

One spouse’s interest in entireties property is subject to the federal tax lien, the rule reaches title taken before 2002, and the circuits divide on what the non-liable spouse is paid when the home is sold.

A tenant by the entirety holds an interest the federal tax lien reaches (United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002)); the decision has its own page and an entry on the Florida entireties page. That page also carries In re Sinnreich, United States v. Ryals, and Gibson v. Wells Fargo Bank, which confine Craft to the IRS; a private creditor, in the Second District’s words, “is not the IRS.”

Hatchett v. United States, 330 F.3d 875 (6th Cir. 2003). Craft applies retroactively. The taxpayers’ non-retroactivity argument failed under Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation; the Sixth Circuit reversed, remanded for judgment consistent with Craft, and reinstated the Government’s fraudulent-conveyance claim as well. Certiorari was denied in 2004.

United States v. Barr, 617 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2010). When an entireties home is sold under § 7403, the non-liable spouse receives fifty percent of the proceeds. Tenants by the entirety “have equal interests in their home,” and actuarial valuation “is not appropriate”; Rodgers used it “only out of necessity” because a homestead interest is effectively a life estate. 617 F.3d at 373-74. Certiorari was denied in 2011. The Sixth Circuit has applied the rule to Kentucky as well as Michigan.

United States v. Cardaci, 856 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2017). The non-liable spouse’s share of a § 7403 sale is computed with joint-life actuarial tables, not a flat half and not as if she held an exclusive life estate. 856 F.3d at 278-79. That appeal went to the Government; the district court’s refusal to order a sale was vacated for misapplying the Rodgers factors, and the discretion to decline a sale is “exercised rigorously and sparingly.” The case settled on remand, so no court ran the calculation.

In re Pletz, 221 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit values spouses’ interests with joint-life actuarial tables when marital property is sold for one spouse’s tax debt, and computes the non-liable spouse’s compensation under Rodgers. Cardaci follows it. Within the Third Circuit the rule stops at cash; Popky v. United States, 419 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2005), still splits already-liquidated entireties funds equally, because there is no life estate in cash.

Section 7403 lets the United States sue to enforce the lien and have the whole property sold, with the non-liable owner paid from the proceeds. Craft is the IRS’s rule. No decision on record extends Craft to an SEC or FTC judgment, though a criminal restitution lien borrows it (In re Conrad, below). The entireties and federal liens page applies these rules to a Florida couple. The entireties chart lists the states that recognize tenancy by the entirety.

Homestead Against the IRS

A state homestead exemption does not stop a federal tax lien, but a forced sale of the home takes a court order, and a co-owner who owes nothing is paid for her interest.

Three IRS homestead decisions are entries on the Florida homestead creditor-exceptions page: United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983), Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), and In re Millsaps, 379 B.R. 202 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).

Under Rodgers, a court may order the whole home sold, its discretion to refuse is limited, and the non-liable spouse receives complete compensation for her own interest; there is no half rule. In Weitzner, federal tax liens were foreclosed on a Florida homestead. Millsaps holds that a debtor cannot avoid a federal tax lien in bankruptcy as a judicial lien or a security interest.

Harris v. United States, 764 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1985). The federal tax lien reached the proceeds of the non-liable wife’s community property and homestead for the husband’s tax debt. Her alter-ego argument and her homestead claim both failed. The Fifth Circuit values the spouses’ interests with actuarial tables, the rule Cardaci later followed.

United States v. Estabrook, 78 F. Supp. 2d 558 (N.D. Tex. 1999). The federal tax lien “attaches even if the property is classified as homestead under state law,” citing Rodgers. Texas’s constitutional homestead exemption did not stop it.

Section 6334(e) requires a judge or magistrate’s written approval before the IRS levies on a principal residence, and § 7403 is the separate route by which the Government sues to sell the property. The four Rodgers factors all concern the non-liable owner. The homestead exemption chart compares the state exemptions ordinary creditors face. The Florida homestead and IRS page applies these rules to a Florida home.

The Ten-Year Collection Period

The IRS has ten years from assessment to collect. A bankruptcy trustee can borrow that ten years to undo a transfer that state law had already put beyond reach, though no court of appeals has decided that he may.

The Florida decision Mukamal v. Citibank (In re Kipnis), 555 B.R. 877 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), is analyzed on its own page and entered on the Florida fraudulent transfer page. The trustee borrowed the IRS’s ten-year period through § 544(b) against Florida’s four.

Ebner v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 525 B.R. 697 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). Leading case. The same rule two years before Kipnis, reasoned at length. Because § 544(b)(1) is clear, the court did not reach policy; the creditor whose “governmental capacity” counts is the IRS, not the estate representative, 525 B.R. at 713, and the slippery-slope objection was “a logical fallacy that actual experience has disproven.” Id. at 712. The IRS claim was about $5,000 against roughly $18 million of liabilities.

Wagner v. Ultima Homes (In re Vaughan Co.), 498 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). The minority side. Letting the trustee use the ten-year lookback “would effectively eviscerate” the state fraudulent-transfer law’s four-year period. 498 B.R. at 305. Kaiser, Kipnis, and CVAH each criticize it by name, and no bankruptcy court has followed it.

Hillen v. City of Many Trees (In re CVAH, Inc.), 570 B.R. 816 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2017). Follows Kaiser and Kipnis; the length of the lookback “in no way impacts or changes the operation of § 544(b)(1),” 570 B.R. at 829, and Vaughan is rejected at 835. The court also reached whether the trustee may instead borrow the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act’s six-year period, a question taken up below.

Section 6502(a) gives the IRS a ten-year window after assessment to collect by levy or suit. Section 6503 suspends that clock during a Tax Court case, during a bankruptcy case, and while the taxpayer spends six continuous months or more outside the country. In bankruptcy, a transfer that is safe from ordinary creditors after four years is not safe if the IRS was a creditor on the petition date. Four bankruptcy courts, Kaiser, Kipnis, CVAH, and Gaither, stand against Vaughan alone. The question was still being argued in 2023, and Congress has not answered it. The bankruptcy case law page collects the bankruptcy decisions on the trustee’s borrowed claim.

Trusts and Nominees Against the IRS

A spendthrift trust does not stop a federal tax lien, property titled in a nominee or an alter ego is reachable, and the Supreme Court has never decided the spendthrift question.

Bank One Ohio Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 1996). Leading case. The federal tax lien attaches to a beneficiary’s interest in an Ohio spendthrift trust. Read v. United States, 169 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 1999), reached the same result under a Louisiana spendthrift trust, and In re Orr, 180 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1999), reached a spendthrift beneficiary’s interest for his own federal tax liability.

In re Laughlin, 602 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2010). Drye‘s reasoning applied to a spendthrift trust; a beneficiary’s disclaimer or renunciation does not defeat the federal tax lien. State law fixes what the beneficiary holds, and federal law decides whether the lien reaches it.

Holman v. United States, 505 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2007). Leading case on nominees. The nominee inquiry runs property interest by property interest. One co-owner held her half in her own right, not as a nominee, while another held an undivided interest the IRS could reach. Being on the deed with the taxpayer does not make a co-owner a nominee.

Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2005). A quiet-title action to remove a nominee federal tax lien; the nominee theory is one of the Government’s recognized routes to property titled in another’s name.

Fourth Investment LP v. United States, 720 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013). State law supplies the nominee test. The court rejected the argument that California does not recognize nominee ownership and ran the inquiry through California law. Spotts and Holman apply multi-factor tests that read as federal common law; no court has framed the difference as a split.

The Tax Court’s decision in Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-4, has its own page and an entry in the offshore case library, which also carries Eulich v. United States. In Campbell a Nevis trust was kept out of the IRS’s reasonable collection potential, and in Eulich an IRS contempt motion turned on a Bahamian trustee’s records.

The alter-ego route reaches a corporation that is the mere alter ego of the taxpayer (Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The nominee route reaches property a company holds for him (Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has never decided whether a spendthrift trust defeats a federal tax lien; the rule rests on the circuits and on Drye‘s reasoning.

Florida’s trust code keeps a support-standard interest from ordinary creditors, and the federal tax lien is the exception; the IRS and irrevocable trust page applies the rule to a Florida trust. In July 2026 the Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished order, affirmed a lien on a resulting-trust theory without reaching nominee law (RC Smithfield, LLC v. United States, No. 24-4057 (10th Cir. July 6, 2026)).

Criminal Restitution and Fines

A federal restitution order is enforced like a tax lien against everything the defendant owns, and only a short federal list survives it. For conduct since April 1996 the liability lasts twenty years from the judgment or the defendant’s release, whichever comes later.

United States v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 764 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014). Leading case. The United States may enforce a restitution judgment against property of the bankruptcy estate itself, because § 3613(a)’s “notwithstanding any other Federal law” clause defeats the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Code is absent from the statute’s three exceptions, and “we will not impute a Bankruptcy Code exception in § 3613 where none has been enumerated.” 764 F.3d at 562. The debtor’s Tennessee-exempt IRA and two of three cars went to the restitution creditors.

United States v. Kaczynski, 551 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). Section 3613 survived a First Amendment challenge. The opinion describes how the lien works. The lien “arises automatically upon entry of judgment” and reaches property of every kind. 551 F.3d at 1125. Enforcement runs under the civil procedure of the state where the court sits, and a restitution order may be enforced by all “available and reasonable means.” Id. at 1130. The Government sold the defendant’s own writings to fund restitution.

United States v. Norwood, 49 F.4th 189 (3d Cir. 2022). Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which governed conduct before April 24, 1996, the lien became unenforceable and the liability expired twenty years after the judgment. Under the MVRA the liability runs from release as well, and the lien lives as long as the liability. The Third Circuit held that applying the MVRA’s longer period to pre-1996 conduct violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 49 F.4th at 200-01. Five circuits have gone the other way, and the Eighth Circuit has since joined the Third.

Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. 163 (2026). Restitution under the MVRA is criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Act labels restitution a penalty for a criminal offense, only a convicted defendant can be ordered to pay it, and it is imposed at sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. A unanimous Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded. On remand, United States v. Ellingburg, No. 23-3129 (8th Cir. Aug. 20, 2026), held that the MVRA’s longer period cannot be applied to pre-1996 conduct, reversing its own 2024 position.

United States v. Myers, 136 F.4th 917 (9th Cir. 2025). Section 3664(n) lets the Government take “substantial resources” a defendant receives from any source while in prison, and the Ninth Circuit held the phrase is not limited to windfalls. Deposits from family and friends totaling $1,233.73 accumulated in an inmate trust account and were properly turned over. The court declined to follow Hughes and reserved whether the provision reaches an inmate’s own prison wages. The panel amended the opinion in March 2026 and denied rehearing.

United States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 2019). Two limits on collection. Where the judgment sets an installment schedule and does not make the full amount due at once, the Government can enforce only what the court ordered, absent a default or a modified schedule; a turnover order was vacated. And prison wages that build up slowly are not “substantial resources” under § 3664(n), which “refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections.” Other circuits divide, the First and Sixth reading it the same way and the Eighth and Ninth reading it broadly.

Section 3613(a) lets the Government enforce a fine or restitution order against all of the defendant’s property, notwithstanding any other federal law. Only ten items imported from the § 6334(a) levy list and the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s wage cap survive it, and the Debt Collection Procedures Act’s exemption election is switched off. The imported list skips the wage exempt amount, public assistance, and the principal-residence protection, so none of those three limits a restitution creditor.

Subsection (c) makes the order a lien as if the liability were an assessed tax, subsection (d) gives a filed notice tax-lien priority, and subsection (e) bars discharge in bankruptcy. Congress wrote the restitution sentence and the estate’s liability after death into subsection (b) in December 2016. The later-of rule has governed restitution since the MVRA, so a flat twenty years states the old law.

Restitution Against Exempt Property

Neither ERISA, a state homestead exemption, nor entireties title stops a criminal restitution order, and the Government takes the present right the defendant himself holds, no less and no more.

United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Leading case. The MVRA lets the Government collect restitution from a retirement plan, “the anti-alienation provision of ERISA notwithstanding.” 476 F.3d at 1053. The Government “steps into the defendant’s shoes,” so it can garnish the plan’s corpus “if, but only if, the terms of the plan allow the defendant to demand a lump sum payment” today. Id. at 1063. The court overruled United States v. Jackson, 229 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2000), to the extent it conflicts.

United States v. Wells, No. 23-3969 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025). The Government cashed out a married defendant’s Thrift Savings Plan account without his wife’s consent, and the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution orders. The Government can cash out a retirement account only when the plan’s terms would let the defendant do so, and when the balance is subject to spousal protections, “the balance is not the defendant’s ‘property,'” so § 3613(a) cannot reach it. The protection is plan-specific. Where a plan requires no survivor annuity, the Government needs no spousal consent.

United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2010). The Government may garnish a state-run pension for restitution; § 3613(a) overrides the Internal Revenue Code’s anti-alienation provision, and Louisiana’s constitutional and statutory pension exemptions are preempted. 620 F.3d at 540-43. But a monthly pension benefit is “earnings” under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, so only 25 percent of it may be garnished, while a present lump-sum cash-out right of $77,898 was taken in full. Id. at 543-45.

United States v. Sayyed, 862 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2017). A lump-sum distribution of retirement funds is not “earnings,” so the 25 percent cap does not apply. 862 F.3d at 619-20. A defendant with the unrestricted right to withdraw cannot make the Government wait to see which form of payment he would prefer. The limit runs both ways; where the defendant’s right to a lump sum is conditional, the Government takes it subject to the same condition. About $327,000 of the defendant’s accounts went to the victim.

United States v. Frank, 8 F.4th 320 (4th Cir. 2021). The MVRA reaches ERISA-protected 401(k) funds notwithstanding the anti-alienation provision, joining what the court called “a nationwide judicial consensus.” The Government stands in the defendant’s shoes and acquires his rights to the funds, “no less, but also no more.” Its access may be limited by the plan’s terms or by early-withdrawal penalties, and a lump-sum distribution is not “earnings.” The court vacated and remanded for a finding of what present right the defendant held.

United States v. Hyde, 497 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2007). Leading case. The proceeds of a home the debtor had claimed as exempt in his own Chapter 7 case were reachable by MVRA garnishment “whether or not the exemption applies.” 497 F.3d at 107. The “notwithstanding” clause supersedes conflicting federal law, so “neither Massachusetts law nor the Bankruptcy Code restricts the reach of the MVRA’s clear language.” Id. at 108. State exemptions fall for a different reason, the Supremacy Clause, on Rodgers‘s authority. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits treat the decision as a holding.

United States v. Jaffe, 314 F. Supp. 2d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). This is a sentencing opinion; it fixed a restitution schedule and enforced nothing. The court refused to order any particular asset sold. It then said that if the home turned out to be the only asset left, “Florida homestead law will not protect him,” because § 3613(a) lists no exemption for a home. 314 F. Supp. 2d at 226-27. Its ERISA discussion rests on decisions since overruled and no longer states the law.

Dahlman v. United States (In re Dahlman), 304 B.R. 892 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). A § 3613(c) fine-and-restitution lien attached to a Florida debtor’s interest in homestead property he held with his wife as tenants by the entireties. The debtor’s counsel conceded that Craft controlled attachment. The court denied summary judgment on the lien’s extent, leaving valuation open, as Craft itself had. A bankruptcy court will not revisit the restitution amount or its credits.

United States v. Lazaro, 603 F. App’x 769 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). A restitution lien attached to the defendant’s interest in a Miami home he held with his wife by the entireties. It survived the later divorce-court transfer of his interest to her. The panel applied Craft directly and Ryals with it. The lien, recorded first, took priority over later federal income-tax liens. The decision binds no later court and appears under the caption United States v. De Cespedes as well.

United States v. McArthur, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (S.D. Ala. 2014). An Alabama federal court held a Navy Federal account was entireties property under Florida law and let the Government garnish it anyway. A restitution lien is treated like a federal tax lien and, under Craft, reaches a spouse’s interest notwithstanding state law; the court ordered one-half of the account turned over. 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1225-26. The half-interest turnover was that court’s disposition on its facts; no rule fixes the fraction.

In re Conrad, 544 B.R. 568 (Bankr. D. Md. 2016), aff’d, Conrad v. Schlossberg, 555 B.R. 514 (D. Md. 2016). A debtor’s entireties interest was not exempt in bankruptcy against a restitution judgment entered against her alone, because the applicable nonbankruptcy law is federal, and federal law subjects the interest to process. The court found “no meaningful difference” between the restitution statute’s words and the tax lien’s, 544 B.R. at 572-73, and the scheme treats restitution like unpaid taxes. Whether the Government’s unfiled notice of lien changes anything was left open.

United States v. Elashi, 789 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2015). Where the MVRA and the Debt Collection Procedures Act conflict on exemptions, the MVRA controls, so the Act’s co-ownership limits yield. 789 F.3d at 552-53. The United States garnished 25 percent of the non-debtor wife’s salary for her husband’s criminal assessment, over a Texas constitutional provision that wages may never be garnished. The mechanism is community property, so the holding is confined to community-property states; the reasoning that the MVRA displaces the Act’s limits applies everywhere.

United States v. Harris, 854 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2017). A beneficiary’s interest in two irrevocable, discretionary support trusts his parents created, each with a spendthrift clause, was “property” the Government could garnish for restitution. California law let him ask a court to review the trustees’ discretion, so the interest was more than an expectation, and “a spendthrift clause does not protect a trust’s assets” against a federal lien. 854 F.3d at 1057. The Government did not seek to compel distributions; the writ catches distributions when made. The irrevocable trust page applies the decision.

Each court of appeals that has reached the question holds that § 3613(a) overrides ERISA’s anti-alienation provision; the Eleventh Circuit has expressly reserved it. The only cap is the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s 25 percent, and it protects periodic pension payments; a lump sum the defendant could take today is not earnings.

Where the Government elects to enforce under state law rather than federal law, state exemptions can apply (United States v. France, below). The Eleventh Circuit has issued no binding decision on Florida’s constitutional homestead exemption against the MVRA. An unpublished 2015 order found no state-exemption exception in the statute (United States v. Wright, 621 F. App’x 617 (11th Cir. 2015)).

Federal Civil Judgments

The United States collects a civil judgment under its own procedures act, which lets the debtor elect state exemptions, reaches co-owned property only as far as state law allows, and does not apply at all to an SEC disgorgement order.

SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1993). Leading case. An SEC disgorgement order is not a “debt” under the Debt Collection Procedures Act, so the defendants “could not avail themselves of state law exemptions under the Debt Act.” 996 F.2d at 803. The district court had cut one defendant’s disgorgement to nothing by Texas homestead, personal-property, and retirement-plan exemptions; the Fifth Circuit reversed. A court may still, in its discretion, exempt some property and take state law as its guide. Id. at 803.

SEC v. AMX, International, Inc., 7 F.3d 71 (5th Cir. 1993). A consent-judgment disgorgement is still not a debt. 7 F.3d at 75. The district court had spared a $250,000 Texas homestead under the Act’s election; the Fifth Circuit reversed, but only because the court believed itself “precluded” from considering the homestead. A court may spare the home; in the Fifth Circuit’s words, “it is not required to compel disgorgement of the residence.” Id. at 76. On remand the district court declined to take the homestead into account.

CFTC v. Escobio, 946 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit drew the line between disgorgement and restitution. The court wrote that “disgorgement is not a money judgment reduced to a debt owed to the United States.” 946 F.3d at 1252 n.11. A restitution obligation measured by customer losses, by contrast, “is reduceable to a debt.” Loss-based restitution is therefore collected only through the Act’s own remedies, and disgorgement sits outside the Act entirely.

United States v. France, 782 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2015). Section 3613(a)(2) switches the Act’s exemption election off. The Government moved for garnishment under § 3613 alone, so “state law exemptions are inapplicable to the government’s enforcement efforts.” 782 F.3d at 826. Where the Government instead elects state law to create and enforce its lien, state exemptions come with it (Paul Revere Insurance Group v. United States, 500 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2007)). Payments from a privately bought disability policy are not “earnings,” a holding that splits with the Eighth Circuit.

United States v. TDC Management Corp., 263 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D.D.C. 2017). “The FDCPA itself creates no property rights, it merely attaches property rights created under state law,” 263 F. Supp. 3d at 265, quoting the D.C. Circuit. Co-owned property is garnishable to the extent state law allows, and D.C. entireties property is beyond one spouse’s creditors. But the shield stops at the corporation. Escrowed funds belonged to the company the spouses owned by the entireties, and the Government reached them by reverse veil-piercing.

Section 3201 gives a federal civil judgment a lien on the debtor’s real estate, and on real estate only, for twenty years, renewable once. The lien is filed like a notice of federal tax lien. Section 3014 lets an individual debtor elect either the federal bankruptcy list or the exemptions of his home state, plus any entireties or joint interest that nonbankruptcy law shields. The election exists only in a proceeding under the Act and is unavailable against a criminal judgment.

Section 3010 enforces the Act’s remedies against co-owned property only as state law allows, and § 3003(d) preempts inconsistent state law. Whether a co-owner must make a § 3014 election to claim that limit is undecided. No Supreme Court decision construes the Act, no circuit decision construes the judgment-lien section, and no bankruptcy court has construed the exemption election. The Florida federal judgment collection page applies these rules to a Florida debtor.

Federal Fraudulent Transfer Claims

The United States has six years to void a transfer made to defeat a federal debt, or, if later, two years after it could have discovered an actual-intent transfer. The federal claim displaces any state law that says the transfer never happened.

United States Small Business Administration v. Bensal, 853 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2017). Leading case. A debtor’s disclaimer of an inheritance is a “transfer” the United States may void under § 3304(a), and § 3003(d) preempts the California statute saying a disclaimer is not a voidable transfer. 853 F.3d at 997-98. Property held in trust is property under the Act. Timing decided the case; “when a debtor executes a disclaimer after a debt has already been accrued, then a state disclaimer law does not control.” Id. at 999.

FTC v. Hoskins, No. 24-5747 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2026). The Act preempts Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations on judgment enforcement, because the Act “has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government.” Nevada’s alter-ego prerequisite was displaced too, so the FTC could levy on trust-held property without a separate alter-ego action. The panel restated Bensal as holding that the Act preempted California’s disclaimer law. A partial dissent contested only whether an FTC consumer-redress decree is a “debt.”

United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2010). The Act’s fraudulent-transfer sections, the court held, “are not written in terms of legal and rightful ownership.” 594 F.3d at 567. A debtor who had stolen the money still made a transfer, because he possessed it and had the power to move it, so the recipient could not defend on the ground that the thief never owned it. An illegal gambling debt is not reasonably equivalent value, § 3306 is remedial rather than punitive, and the transferee gets no setoff for money paid back.

United States v. Loftis, 607 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2010). A federal investigator visited the husband’s company, and days later the couple partitioned their community property; the wife took $2,337,777.16. The lawyer’s advice, the court recorded, was “to move assets from one spouse to another to preserve the acquired assets.” The partition was voidable. 607 F.3d at 176-78. Reasonably equivalent value is judged from the creditor’s view on the transfer date; the husband faced prison and restitution, so his future income was worth little to a creditor.

Vieira v. Gaither (In re Gaither), 595 B.R. 201 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2018). Under § 544(b) a chapter 7 trustee can borrow the IRS’s collection powers. The Debt Collection Procedures Act is “applicable law” the trustee may borrow, 595 B.R. at 212-14, a reading that departs from In re Mirant. The Act applies to the IRS, whose transferee-liability statute is not its exclusive remedy. The ruling denied a motion to dismiss; nothing was avoided and nothing recovered.

MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G. (In re Mirant Corp.), 675 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2012). The only circuit decision on the question, and it comes out against the trustee. The Act is not “applicable law” under § 544(b), because treating it so “would impermissibly modify the operation of Title 11” contrary to § 3003(c)(1). 675 F.3d at 536. Nine bankruptcy courts have gone the other way; a trustee’s power to borrow the Government’s six-year window turns on the courthouse.

Samson v. Spencer (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2023). A trustee stepping into the IRS’s shoes invoked § 3304 against the debtor’s disclaimer of a $375,000 trust share. The court agreed the Act is “applicable law,” held the debtor had an interest in property under the Act’s definition, and held Illinois’s relation-back provision preempted. The motions to dismiss were denied; no avoidance judgment followed and nothing was clawed back.

Section 3304 voids a transfer the debtor makes “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.” Debts that arise after the transfer count too. The section also voids a transfer that returns less than reasonably equivalent value and leaves the debtor unable to pay. Where the debt is collectible like a tax, § 3003(b) preserves the tax route as well, which in Loftis reached the wife’s solely managed property.

Section 3306 gives the Government six years, or two years from discovery on an actual-intent claim if that is later; the discovery tail belongs to actual-intent claims only, and Florida’s own act runs four years. The preemption clause has now displaced state law in California, Illinois, Washington, and Nevada, and no court has yet applied it to Florida’s disclaimer statute or its homestead exemption.

Criminal Forfeiture

A criminal forfeiture vests title in the United States at the moment of the offense, reaches untainted substitute property once the tainted property is gone, and gives a spouse or other third party no innocent-owner defense.

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). Leading case. Section 853 contains no exemption for assets a defendant wants to pay his lawyer, and that reading is consistent with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Under the relation-back provision “[a]ll right, title and interest” vests in the United States when the criminal act occurs, on the taint theory of United States v. Stowell. A defendant “cannot give good title . . . because he did not hold good title.” 491 U.S. at 625-28, 631-33.

Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5 (2016). Freezing a defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets before trial, when she needs them to hire the lawyer she chooses, violates the Sixth Amendment. Tainted property belongs to the Government from the offense onward under the relation-back rule; untainted property “belongs to the defendant, pure and simple.” The decision is a judgment of the Court with a four-Justice plurality opinion, a concurrence in the judgment, and two dissents.

Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017). Forfeiture under § 853(a)(1) is limited to property the defendant himself acquired from the crime; a co-conspirator is not jointly and severally liable for what another obtained. Section 853(p) is “the sole provision of § 853 that permits the Government to confiscate property untainted by the crime,” and it runs only against the defendant who acquired the tainted property and dissipated it. Every earlier circuit decision imposing joint-and-several forfeiture is superseded.

Under United States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2007), an entry on the Florida homestead creditor-exceptions page, § 853(p) impliedly preempts Florida’s homestead exemption and its entireties law. The forfeiture takes the defendant’s interest alone, and criminal forfeiture carries no innocent-spouse defense.

United States v. Lee, 232 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2000). The other side of a split with Fleet, on the same state’s law. The Government sought a Florida home held by the entireties as a substitute asset, and the Seventh Circuit held that “the house should have been considered unavailable for a substitute asset order.” 232 F.3d at 562. The court reserved property used in the offense. Fleet called the decision “fundamentally wrong about which law determines forfeitability,” and no circuit has joined it. A Florida prosecution is governed by Fleet.

United States v. Stevenson, 834 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2016). A New York constitutional guarantee that public pensions “shall not be diminished or impaired” yields to § 853(a)’s “irrespective of any provision of State law” and to § 853(p). A convicted assemblyman’s retirement contributions were forfeited as substitute assets. 834 F.3d at 85-88. The court collected the preemption line, which covers Florida homestead and entireties law, an Oklahoma homestead, an Iowa homestead, and Georgia’s IRA garnishment protections. The Second Circuit refused to narrow the holding in 2023, vested benefits included.

United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1998). Under RICO’s substitute-asset twin, an individual retirement annuity whose owner’s interest is “nonforfeitable” under the tax code was forfeitable anyway; the word means vested, and ERISA’s anti-alienation provision does not reach individual annuities. A substitute asset need not be proved untainted, and a Florida house bought through a straw owner and then held by the wife was forfeited as the defendant’s property. 159 F.3d at 303-06.

United States v. All Funds Distributed to Weiss, 345 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2003). ERISA’s rule does stop a forfeiture while the plan holds the money. The Government could not seize funds inside the pension plan, because nothing was left for an in rem forfeiture to take. The court held that “until the . . . pension plan funds were distributed to the plan beneficiaries, the government could not have made its forfeiture claim successfully.” 345 F.3d at 55-58. The clock was tolled, and the funds were seized once they reached the beneficiaries’ IRAs.

United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993). Section 853(e) does not authorize the pre-trial restraint of substitute assets, because it reaches only property described in subsection (a) and substitute assets live in subsection (p). The court vacated a freeze on untainted money, including $259,331 of homestead sale proceeds repatriated from Liechtenstein; the Government conceded the money had no connection to the crime. Seven circuits agree; the Fourth Circuit alone allows the restraint. Luis answers the constitutional half where counsel of choice is at stake.

United States v. Bodouva, 853 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017). A mandatory criminal forfeiture order may not be reduced by restitution the defendant has already paid. The two remedies “are authorized by different statutes and serve different purposes.” 853 F.3d at 78-80. One remedies a loss and the other disgorges a gain. The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold the same, so a defendant can owe both in full.

United States v. Bangiyeva, 75 F.4th 445 (4th Cir. 2023). The Government forfeited two siblings’ shares and became a two-thirds tenant in common with the convicted brother’s wife; RICO’s ancillary proceeding follows § 853(n)’s standard. The district court gave her a life estate and exclusive use for as long as she stayed married. The Fourth Circuit vacated that as “a windfall” the court could not create “by arbitrary fiat,” because a tenant in common may use the whole property and seek partition. The court expressly reserved the entireties case.

A third party’s only forum is the § 853(n) ancillary proceeding, where the petitioner must prove her claim by a preponderance (United States v. Huntington National Bank, 574 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2009)). She must show an interest vested in her or superior to the defendant’s when the crime occurred, or a bona fide purchase for value without notice. Relation back closes the first route to anyone who acquired an interest after the offense. The Florida forfeiture page covers the state statute and the Florida constitution’s own bar on forfeiting a homestead.

Civil Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner

Civil forfeiture gives an innocent owner a statutory defense that criminal forfeiture lacks, and an owner who misses the claim deadline never reaches the merits.

Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2007). The Government forfeited a jointly owned Connecticut home after marijuana was grown there. The jury rejected the wife’s innocent-owner defense, and the forfeiture of the husband’s interest stood, but “the Excessive Fines Clause precludes forfeiture of her entire one-half interest.” 492 F.3d at 178-81. The judge, not the jury, decides excessiveness; the court remanded to fix the reduction, and the case then settled, so no decision says what she kept. The Government became her tenant in common. The rule is Second Circuit law.

United States v. Starling, 76 F.4th 92 (2d Cir. 2023). Police seized $8,040 from a woman’s apartment during an investigation of her then-boyfriend, who was later acquitted. She missed the claim deadline and the clerk entered default. The Second Circuit held that a late claim filed after default but before default judgment gets Rule 55(c)’s “good cause” standard, and vacated the default judgment. The court noted that the Government had set a 32-day deadline where the rule requires at least 35, and that most claimants are pro se because the sums rarely justify a lawyer.

United States v. One Single Family Residence at 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). A Florida home was held by the entireties with an innocent spouse. The court held, “none of the property can be forfeited to the United States.” 894 F.2d at 1513-18. Florida’s unities make the entireties ownership inseverable, and converting it to a tenancy in common would take the innocent spouse’s interest. The court noted that § 853(a) preempts state law expressly and § 881 does not. Fleet distinguished it as a civil case.

United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1991). The middle position. With a Pennsylvania tenancy by the entirety and a conceded innocent spouse, the Government may take the guilty spouse’s interest at once. The innocent spouse keeps lifetime use and possession, immunity against alienation or levy without consent, and the survivorship right. 949 F.2d at 74-78. The court rejected both dismissal and the Eleventh Circuit’s lis-pendens approach. In 2023 the Fourth Circuit said in passing that it might find the compromise persuasive.

United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993). Superseded in part by statute. Under the pre-2000 drug forfeiture statute, an owner who acquired the property after the illegal act could still claim as an innocent owner, because the relation-back provision did not vest title in the United States before judgment. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 replaced that rule, and an owner who acquired after the conduct must now be a bona fide purchaser for value. The decision still states the Government’s title as inchoate until judicial condemnation.

Section 983 puts the Government’s burden at a preponderance and, where the theory is facilitation, requires a substantial connection between the property and the offense. An innocent owner keeps her interest. One who held it during the conduct must not have known of the conduct or must have done what could reasonably be expected, and one who acquired later must be a bona fide purchaser for value. A spouse or heir who gave nothing may still keep a primary residence acquired by marriage, divorce, inheritance, or probate, up to the value needed for reasonable shelter.

For a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety the court may sever the property, take it and compensate the innocent owner, or leave it with her subject to a Government lien. “[A] nominee who exercises no dominion or control” is not an owner. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act’s protections do not run against a forfeiture under the Internal Revenue Code. The hardship release excludes currency unless the seized currency is a legitimate business’s assets.

SEC Disgorgement and FTC Remedies

The SEC now has express statutory power to seek disgorgement, ten years to bring the claim where scienter must be proved, and no need to show that any investor lost money. The FTC lost its route to monetary relief in 2021.

Sripetch v. SEC, No. 25-466 (U.S. June 4, 2026). Leading case. A showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may obtain disgorgement. A claimant “does not need to prove he has suffered a corresponding loss or, indeed, any loss,” and Liu‘s reference to relief awarded for victims imports no loss requirement. A unanimous Court left open “whether or how § 78u(d)(7) affects the scope of the SEC’s disgorgement powers.” SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023), which had required pecuniary harm, was abrogated.

Kokesh v. SEC, 581 U.S. 455 (2017). Superseded by statute on its limitations point. The Court held SEC disgorgement a penalty, so the five-year limit of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 governed it. Congress answered in the 2021 defense authorization act, which gives the SEC five years for a disgorgement claim and ten years where the violation requires scienter. The decision still states what it decided; the operative limitations rule is now the statute.

Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020). Disgorgement is permissible equitable relief under § 78u(d)(5) where it does not exceed the wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims. Sripetch narrowed the second limb, and whether either limb constrains an award under the new § 78u(d)(7) is open; the Court itself said so in 2026.

SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit read the amended § 78u(d) to authorize legal disgorgement, not equitable disgorgement, ratifying the approach the circuits used before Liu. 42 F.4th at 338, 341, 343. Liu‘s net-profits limit therefore does not bind such an award there. The Second Circuit declined to follow it in Ahmed, below, and the Supreme Court left the split standing in June 2026. The same opinion confined Huffman to its holding on the Debt Collection Procedures Act.

Under AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67 (2021), § 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes injunctions only, not restitution or disgorgement. In the Eleventh Circuit, FTC v. On Point Capital Partners LLC, 17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021), applied the rule; a freeze premised on that section alone falls with the monetary relief. Both decisions are covered on the Florida asset-freeze page.

Section 78u(d)(7), added in January 2021, lets the SEC seek and a federal court order disgorgement in any enforcement action. Section 78u(d)(8) gives five years for a disgorgement claim, ten years where the violation involves scienter, and ten years for any other equitable remedy, and it stops the clock while the defendant is outside the United States.

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act grants no monetary relief. The FTC’s money now runs through § 19, which requires a rule violation or a final cease-and-desist order and carries a three-year limit, or through civil penalties. No court has decided whether the FTC can still reach a relief defendant under § 19. An SEC disgorgement judgment is not discharged in bankruptcy (In re Bilzerian, 153 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1998)).

Agency Freezes and Receiverships

A federal enforcement agency can freeze a defendant’s assets on a lesser showing than an injunction requires, reach money he gave to a spouse or child, and put everything under a receiver whose stay binds strangers to the fraud.

The Anderson case, FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), is analyzed on its own page and anchors the offshore case library. That library also carries SEC v. Bilzerian, SEC v. Solow, FTC v. AmeriDebt, SEC v. Brennan, In re Lawrence, Rigby v. Mastro, Paoloni v. Goldstein, FDIC v. Lewis, and TMSF v. Merrill Lynch. Those entries hold the repatriation orders and contempt sanctions entered against offshore-trust settlors.

The receiver-clawback line led by Wiand v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014), sits on the Florida fraudulent transfer page, and National Maritime Services, Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2015), on the Florida judgment collection page.

SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 1998). Leading case. A court may order equitable relief against someone not accused of wrongdoing “where that person: (1) has received ill-gotten funds; and (2) does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.” 155 F.3d at 136. A wife who unknowingly received $500,000 of scheme proceeds had no legitimate claim; she “stands in the shoes of her husband.” An asset freeze needs only a likelihood of success, a lesser showing than an injunction requires. Id. at 132.

Smith v. SEC, 653 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2011). A relief-defendant wife’s separately titled assets, a stock account inherited from her father, a checking account, and a Florida vacation home, were frozen because the husband had “unfettered control” and the transfers into her sole name came after the FINRA investigation began. The Second Circuit affirmed a court-ordered sale of the Florida home before any adjudication of liability. A children’s trust escaped the freeze until an undisclosed annuity agreement promising the couple about $500,000 a year came to light. 653 F.3d at 127-29.

SEC v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379 (2d Cir. 2023). The SEC joined the defendant’s wife, three minor children, and affiliated entities as relief defendants, and the court froze their assets. The defendant’s own assets need no tracing; any of them may be liquidated for his disgorgement. For relief defendants the inquiry runs asset by asset, the SEC bears the burden of production, and a third party who gave value without notice keeps the asset as a bona fide purchaser. The court also held that Liu‘s limits survive the 2021 amendment. 72 F.4th at 395-96.

SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980). Leading case on receiverships. The receivership power “does not in the first instance depend on a statutory grant”; equity’s inherent power supplies it. 622 F.2d at 1369. A district court may stay all proceedings against the receivership, effective against non-parties who have notice, and Rule 65(d) does not limit that power. Id. at 1371. The three factors for lifting the stay are listed in SEC v. Wencke, 742 F.2d 1230, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984), and the stay is not permanent.

Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). The receiver of the corporations a Ponzi schemer used has standing to recover the transfers out of them. The in pari delicto bar “loses its sting when the person who is in pari delicto is eliminated.” 56 F.3d at 753-55. Transfers to the schemer’s ex-wife and his charities were recoverable. The rule needs a legally distinct entity; where the wrongdoer emptied his own personal account there is no injury to sue on, and the Seventh Circuit has refused to extend it against third-party brokers.

In re Bilzerian, 258 B.R. 850 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). Eleven days after the SEC’s receiver was appointed, the settlor in SEC v. Bilzerian filed Chapter 7, and the case was dismissed for cause. Of $139,762,828 in scheduled debt, $130,650,328 was already nondischargeable, and the receiver would function as a trustee. He had moved assets into a Cook Islands trust, a children’s trust, an entireties holding company, and a Nevada partnership “purposefully to insulate his assets from the reach of his creditors.” His contempt incarceration fell within the police-power exception to the stay.

SEC v. Byers, 592 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A district court may enjoin non-parties from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against receivership entities. Quoting United States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983), the court said “a debtor subject to a federal receivership has no absolute right to file a bankruptcy petition,” though a receivership rarely precludes one. The court applied the three Wencke factors and kept the injunction. A receiver who files becomes a debtor in possession, so the custodian turnover rule does not apply.

Section 78u(d)(5) lets the SEC seek any equitable relief “appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors,” and modern courts pair the inherent receivership power with it. The relief-defendant rule has been adopted by at least eight circuits, and no court has declined to follow it. Since 2016 the courts have made it harder for an agency to strip a third party who paid. To keep what he received, the recipient must have given something of value in exchange, and in the Second Circuit must also have lacked notice of the asset’s true source.

A spouse who took assets under a separation agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is presumed to have given fair consideration. CFTC v. Walsh, 658 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2011), vacated a freeze over an ex-wife on that ground, though relinquishing a claim to a larger share of fraud proceeds is not consideration. The FTC’s half of the relief-defendant line rested on § 13(b) money judgments and no longer stands on that footing after AMG.

Federal Creditors Compared

Federal creditors collect in tiers. The IRS and a criminal restitution judgment reach property no private creditor can touch; the SEC and the FTC sit below them, with public budgets and statutory remedies; an ordinary judgment creditor faces every state exemption in full.

Creditor	Lien source	Duration	Exemptions honored	ERISA and retirement accounts	Tenancy by the entirety	Homestead	Trusts and offshore trusts
The IRS	§ 6321 lien on every interest the taxpayer holds, arising at assessment (Mitchell, Bess)	Ten years from assessment, suspended under § 6503; a bankruptcy trustee may borrow it (Kaiser, Kipnis; no circuit has decided)	Only the § 6334(a) federal list, from levy and not from the lien (Mitchell, Voelker)	Levied to full face value (Sawaf, McIntyre); Patterson protects only against private creditors and trustees; an IRA is not on the list (Lawler)	Attaches to one spouse’s interest (Craft, Hatchett); the non-liable spouse gets half in the Sixth Circuit (Barr) and an actuarial share in the Third, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth (Cardaci, Pletz)	No bar to the lien (Weitzner, Estabrook); a § 7403 sale is discretionary and the co-owner is compensated (Rodgers); a residence levy needs a judge’s approval	Spendthrift trusts do not stop the lien (Bank One Ohio Trust, Read); nominee and alter-ego property is reached (Holman, Valley Finance); a Nevis trust kept out of collection potential (Campbell); no Supreme Court spendthrift holding
Criminal restitution and fines	§ 3613(c) lien on all property, as if for an assessed tax (Robinson, Kaczynski)	The later of twenty years from judgment or from release, then the estate; pre-1996 conduct keeps the older twenty years from judgment (Norwood, Ellingburg)	Ten items from the § 6334(a) list and the 25 percent wage cap; the § 3014 election is off (France); state exemptions apply only if the Government elects state-law enforcement	Reached (Novak, DeCay, Frank); the Government takes the defendant’s present right and no more (Sayyed); a plan requiring spousal consent cannot be cashed out (Wells); periodic payments capped at 25 percent, lump sums not	Attaches on Craft‘s reasoning (Conrad, Dahlman, Lazaro, McArthur); valuation open	Sale proceeds reached whether or not the state exemption applies (Hyde); no binding Eleventh Circuit holding on Florida’s homestead	A third-party discretionary support trust’s distributions garnished (Harris); no offshore-trust decision located
Federal civil judgments (the Debt Collection Procedures Act)	§ 3201 lien on real property only, filed like a tax lien	Twenty years, renewable once; fraudulent transfers voidable for six years, or two from discovery on actual intent if later (§ 3306)	The debtor elects the federal list or home-state exemptions (§ 3014); a Government that elects state law takes its exemptions too (France, Paul Revere)	§ 3010 does not limit rights in a qualified plan but creates no shield; no decision located	Co-owned property garnishable only as state law allows (§§ 3010, 3205; TDC Management); the shield stops at a corporation the spouses own; whether it is automatic or needs a § 3014 election is undecided	Available through the state-exemption election (§ 3014); against an SEC disgorgement order the election is unavailable and the homestead turns on the court’s discretion (Huffman, AMX)	A disclaimed inheritance is a voidable transfer and state disclaimer law is preempted (Bensal); trust interests count as property under the Act; trust-held property levied without an alter-ego suit (Hoskins); no Florida decision
Forfeiture	Title vests in the United States at the offense (Caplin & Drysdale); substitute assets only under § 853(p) (Honeycutt)	Relation back to the offense; a civil fungible-property action within one year where untraceable (§ 984); a late civil claim gets “good cause” review before default judgment (Starling)	None in criminal forfeiture, “irrespective of any provision of State law”; state pension and homestead protections preempted (Stevenson, Fleet); civil forfeiture’s innocent-owner defense (§ 983(d))	Plan funds unreachable while the plan holds them (Weiss); IRAs and individual annuities forfeited (Infelise)	Criminal: the defendant’s interest forfeited in the Eleventh Circuit (Fleet), the home unavailable in the Seventh (Lee); civil: sever, compensate, or lien under § 983(d)(5) (15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 1500 Lincoln Avenue, Von Hofe)	Preempted in criminal substitute-asset forfeiture (Fleet); homestead sale proceeds not restrainable before trial in the Fifth Circuit (Floyd)	Straw-owner property forfeited as the defendant’s (Infelise); a nominee without dominion or control has no claim (§ 983(d)(6)(B)(iii)); no offshore-trust forfeiture decision located
SEC and FTC enforcement	A loss-based restitution judgment collected under the Debt Collection Procedures Act (Escobio); disgorgement enforced by contempt and equitable orders, outside the Act (Huffman)	An SEC disgorgement claim within five years, ten with scienter, tolled while the defendant is abroad (§ 78u(d)(8)); FTC § 19 claims within three years; a receivership stay lasts until its purpose is served (Wencke)	None against a disgorgement order except in the court’s discretion (Huffman, AMX); the § 3014 election where the judgment is a “debt”	No decision located	Craft has not been carried over to an SEC or FTC judgment by any decision on record; a spouse’s separately titled assets can still be frozen as a relief defendant’s on two findings (Cavanagh, Smith)	Turns on the court’s equitable discretion against disgorgement (AMX); a relief defendant’s Florida vacation home sold before liability was decided (Smith)	Repatriation orders and contempt against offshore-trust settlors (Affordable Media, Lawrence, Bilzerian); a children’s trust re-frozen once a benefit to the settlor surfaced (Smith); a bona fide purchaser keeps the asset (Ahmed)
An ordinary judgment creditor	A state judgment lien under the state’s recording rules (Florida judgment collection case law)	Set by each state’s judgment-lien statute; a fraudulent transfer claim under the state’s own act, four years in Florida	Every exemption the debtor’s state provides (homestead chart, IRA chart)	Plan funds excluded from the bankruptcy estate and beyond a private creditor (Patterson, Guidry); IRAs by state statute (IRA chart)	One spouse’s creditor cannot reach entireties property in the states that recognize it (entireties chart)	The state exemption in full (homestead chart)	Spendthrift and discretionary trusts hold against a private creditor; domestic asset protection trusts on the DAPT decisions page; offshore trusts in the offshore case library

The national IRS page applies the first row to planning completed before a tax liability exists. The best states comparison ranks the state protections the last row rests on. Planning that holds against a private judgment creditor starts from the last row, and each creditor in the rows above takes something a private judgment creditor cannot.